Do the most vulnerable refugees get resettled?

Googling this question results in headlines such as “World’s most vulnerable refugees struggle as US welcome mat shrinks”, “Pausing the Refugee Resettlement Program Will Harm the Most Vulnerable” and “World’s most vulnerable: are we responsible for them all? ”, reflecting US President Trump’s recent – now suspended – Executive Orders that, among other things, reduced the US’s intake of resettled refugees to 50,000 per fiscal year.

[Featured photo: “Canada ‘an inspiration’ on Syrian refugee resettlement”]

What is resettlement?

Resettlement is the transfer of refugees (who have, by definition, fled persecution in their country of origin) from one country to a third country where they are given a permanent legal status and expected to settle permanently; it’s been around since the 1970s in greater or lesser numbers. Resettlement globally is an established arrangement, whereby families and individuals are identified and screened by UNHCR according to seven categories (to which participating States have agreed) and are then sent to different resettlement countries. The resettlement countries evaluate the cases, conduct security checks, interview the families in many cases, and give a decision. Successful resettle-ees are transferred to their new country by IOM, and are received either by NGOs or the government entities responsible for them. Refugees in the resettlement pipeline are extensively vetted and screened, and it is the resettlement country that makes the final decision who goes and who stays. States have a legal obligation to receive refugees who show up on their territory, but resettlement is completely voluntary – which is why the two concepts should not be conflated, nor is resettlement the solution to a State’s unwillingness to abide by their legal responsibilities.

 

What is vulnerability?

‘Protection’ vulnerability

UNHCR and countries, together, have established a number of categories that they have collectively agreed represent the most vulnerable refugees, or, phrased differently, the refugees most in need of resettlement. These categories are: medical needs, women and girls at risk, survivors of violence and/or torture, children at risk, legal and/or physical protection needs, and refugees lacking foreseeable alternative durable solutions. Although they probably don’t cover all possible eventualities, these categories do seem to encompass quite a number of vulnerabilities that would make resettlement the best solution for that particular family. Often, two or more of the categories are applicable – people who were tortured often have medical needs or may fear continued persecution, for example; a woman at risk may also have children who are at risk.

 

“New study finds child marriage on the rise among vulnerable Syrian refugees.” Also, what’s with the signs?

 

The resettlement categories are all centered around a perspective of vulnerability that focuses on “protection” (protection, in refugee speak, is ensuring access and fulfillment of rights under national and international law). For example, someone with legal or physical protection needs might be in a situation where their rights to physical security, safety, liberty, etc., are not being respected; if there is no way to change the situation (i.e. where their asylum country is not able to ensure security or justice) they may need to be resettled to a different country. Or a woman who is head of household is at risk for sexual exploitation by her landlord or employer due to her vulnerable situation. Or an unaccompanied child who is vulnerable to exploitation or abuse. The focus on ‘protection’ is very understandable; after all, it is one of UNHCR’s core functions, and it is a logical extension of the concept that UNHCR exists to provide protection where the country of nationality can’t or won’t and where the country of asylum can’t or won’t. A protection-centred resettlement programme also makes for compelling individual stories of continued persecution, exploitation, or abuse. Although programming generally includes efforts to prevent or mitigate protection risks as well as establishing response mechanisms, identification of cases that have suffered abuse or exploitation, or are at individual risk, is difficult when considering the population as a whole, and many if not most cases are identified because the person or family themselves reported the situation.

Socio-economic vulnerability

But ‘protection’ is not the only metric by which one can assess vulnerability. Socio-economic vulnerability builds on work and research done on poverty and economic vulnerability to come up with a concept of vulnerability that focuses primarily on economic indicators, such as expenditures and assets, but should also encompass social metrics as well. The benefit of this kind of approach is that it is frequently more easily quantifiable – rather than the qualitative kind of approach taken with protection-related vulnerabilities – and hence can be applied over a wider population if proper tools are developed. Such initiatives in the Middle East, for example, have resulted in the Vulnerability Assessment Framework applied in Jordan; the VAF “defines the concept in terms of what a given person is vulnerable to, taking different sectors – such as lack of education, lack of documentation, or health liabilities – into account.” As UNHCR describes it, “vulnerability is notoriously difficult to capture […]  One broadly applied way to circumvent this measurement difficulty is to use expenditure as a proxy for refugee welfare.” The VAF therefore calculated a vulnerability score based on an individual interview/assessment with each family. Some of the assumptions and process behind the VAF are described here and some additional material can be found here. A similar approach was taken in Kakuma camp in Kenya, again focusing on expenditures as a proxy for welfare. In Lebanon, socio-economic vulnerability was assessed through a yearly vulnerability assessment (called the VASYR) conducted in a similar manner to the VAF but on a yearly basis so as to track trends over time, and as a second step, by using a predictive statistical model to identify vulnerable families without needing to conduct an individual interview.

Of course, socio-economic vulnerability and protection-related vulnerabilities are inter-linked: lack of (access to) work or documentation leaves people vulnerable to exploitation; people may be exposed to (or expose themselves to) hazardous situations out of economic desperation (for example, pulling children out of school; marrying off children at an early age; survival sex; falling victim to trafficking; etc); and medical conditions may require expensive medications or require the presence of a caregiver which can impact a family’s earning potential or increase expenses. Anecdotal impressions suggest a strong correlation between socio-economic and protection vulnerability, but the causal logic could run in both directions.

Vulnerability and resilience

[You could just skip this whole section and read the study that is extensively quoted here]

“Resilience fundamentally concerns how an individual, household, community, society or state deals with shocks and stresses. […] According to the Regional UN Development Group (R-UNDG) Position Paper, prepared by a UNDG Regional Working Group on Resilience, the resilience-based development approach specifically looks at supporting resilience through development assistance, which aims to support institutions to respond to increased demand and pressure (characterised as “coping”), promote household recovery from the negative impacts of the crisis (“recovering”) and strengthen local and national economic, social and political institutions to protect development gains and enhance performance (“sustaining”).” (Source, p.iii)

This ODI study analyses definitions of vulnerability as considered by different humanitarian actors, and its relationship with the concept of resilience as being interrelated:

“In crisis contexts, vulnerability broadly refers to the likelihood of individuals or systems experiencing negative consequences on account of characteristics that make them exposed to those consequences in the first place ( i.e. exposure) such as being present in zones affected by the crisis and limited ability to manage the impacts of the crisis (i.e. coping capacities). Vulnerability and resilience are closely related because they both concern responses to shocks; they have been characterised as being two sides of the same coin, at opposite ends of the well-being spectrum and part of the same equation. [Furthermore]. analysis of vulnerability applies to different levels (e.g. individuals, households, communities, countries and systems) and to different shocks.” (Source, p.9)

But even if we are considering vulnerability to be an inability to withstand shocks, humanitarian actors still use traditional metrics (protection or economic-based models) to assess vulnerability:

[The Syrian Response Plan in Jordan] highlights the use of chronic poverty, the exposure to refugee influx, more ‘traditional’ categorical individual (or household) characteristics and social exclusion as indicators of vulnerability. The criterion of ‘reduced access’ stands out because, rather than saying that people with disabilities are necessarily vulnerable, it highlights that people with reduced access to resources and services are vulnerable and this may be due to disabilities. It therefore could shift analysis towards ‘who has access’ and ‘who participates’ rather than assuming that all women and older persons are vulnerable. (Source, p.11)

There are limitations in the extent to which such an approach is operationally applicable: the study notes how actors have attempted to establish categories of vulnerabilities that take into account economic constraints, profiles perceived as exposed to risks, and factors expected to represent access to certain rights or services. Although tools have become increasingly sophisticated (see some of the examples from Jordan and Lebanon) in assessing vulnerability for the purposes of identification and prioritization of beneficiaries, the results of these assessments are not frequently used to determine the type or extent of an intervention, and are often constrained by the particular framework of analysis (individual/household assessment vs community vs national level or regional analysis). Finally, there is a twofold limitation to this approach, which is that these models typically identify the symptoms but not the cause, and that, secondly, they do not focus on capacities but only vulnerabilities:

Categories, however, do not identify the ‘drivers’ of vulnerability. Drivers of vulnerability are the factors that influence and determine vulnerability. For individuals, gender inequality can be such a driver. For households, these can include lack of assets, resources and access to power structures. Scorecards and similar approaches can assess that a household is vulnerable because they are in debt and have poor food consumption, but alone do not provide analysis on the factors that are leading to their debt and poor household food consumption. (Source, p.13)

What does this mean for resettlement?

The short, and obvious, answer is that it is not so easy to determine vulnerability, much less assess it in a way that is both objective/systematic, and contextual/individualised. Even more so, how these assessments are conducted determines which families are included in the beginning of the pipeline of the resettlement process, to be screened and analysed for their individual needs and suitability for resettlement.

The Syrian populations in Lebanon and Jordan have proven ideal populations for these kinds of assessments: individually registered, located in areas that are accessible (both due to infrastructure and security), and with substantial international attention that brought the resources needed to conduct massive assessments and develop innovative approaches, especially as agencies were forced to prioritise resources for the “most vulnerable”. Many refugee populations are difficult to access due to security or infrastructure (Yemen, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan) or there are not sufficient resources to carry out such assessments in the face of budget and ration cuts.

Further distortions are caused by the resettlement system itself: countries select the populations that best fit their humanitarian and political goals, which may not directly correspond to the objective needs. Resettlement countries additionally can set additional criteria (in addition to refugee status and meeting one of the above-named vulnerability criteria) such as the “integration potential” requirement that is part of the legislation of some Nordic countries. “Integration potential” does not appear to be clearly defined in law, but is a legal provision that could well be at complete odds to the aims of resettlement itself: after all, those who are most exposed to risks and have the least capacity to withstand them may be the families most in need of resettlement but who will require more assistance once they get there.

With over 1.19 million refugees considered in need of resettlement in 2017, any measure of vulnerability will indicate that the needs far outstrip the available capacity for countries to receive them.

 

 

 

Links

 

• UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, UNHCR, 2011
• 2017 Projected Global Resettlement Needs
• Refugee Household Vulnerability Study: Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kincectica LLC, 2016
• Review of Targeting of Cash and Food Assistance for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, Kay Sharp (UNHCR/WFP commissioned study), July 2015
• Aid effectiveness and Vulnerability Assessment Framework: determining vulnerability among Syrian refugees in Jordan, Field Exchange, 2014
• Vulnerability Assessment Framework (Jordan), UNHCR
• The Syrian displacement crisis and a Regional Development and Protection Programme: Mapping and meta-analysis of existing studies of costs, impacts and protection, 2014
• Lebanon – Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, December 2016
• The Syria crisis, displacement and protection, Forced Migration Review 47, September 2014:
  • The 6.45 million displaced people inside Syria make this the largest IDP crisis in the world, with possibly also the largest number of people who are ‘trapped’. In addition, the number of refugees from Syria continues to increase. The international community has an opportunity to set up, from now, an effective response to what will clearly become protracted displacement. These 20 articles discuss how to increase protection for the displaced and how to shape assistance to both the displaced and their ‘hosts’.
• A Framework for Resilience in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, Columbia University SIPA 2013 Alejandra Kubitschek Bujones, Katrin Jaskiewicz, Lauren Linakis, and Michael McGirr
• Towards a resilience- based response to the Syrian refugee crisis: A critical review of vulnerability criteria and frameworks, Sarah Bailey and Veronique Barbelet, ODI/UNDP
• Towards Human Resilience: Sustaining MDG Progress in an Age of Economic Uncertainty, UNDP 2011
• Good Practices for Urban Refugees: A repository of interesting examples, case studies, and evaluations, a selection of which are included here:
  • The Welfare of Syrian Refugees: Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon (UNHCR / World Bank)
  • Positive Practices in Refugee Protection in the Asia-Pacific Region

  • Just Cities for Children: Voices from Urban Slums

  • Adapting to an Urban World: Urban Food Security Pilot Assessment: Harare, Zimbabwe

International legal concept or convenient excuse? “First country of asylum” and “safe third country” concepts

Is there such a thing in International refugee law as “first country of asylum” and “safe third country” concepts?

(Featured image: reception conditions in Greece, January 2017, Photo: HRW)

Yes and no – and that depends a lot on the interpretation of what is meant by “international refugee law”. Both of these concepts – “first country of asylum” and “safe third country” are enshrined in EU refugee law but are not a part of the 1951 Convention or regional instruments such as the OAU convention or the Cartagena Declaration. Under International Refugee Law, there is no obligation to seek asylum at the first effective opportunity, and States retain their legal responsibility if they have effective control of persons or territory.

In our examples, we will frequently discuss situations in which a refugee from country A has passed through country B and is claiming asylum in country C.

What does the 1951 Convention say?

The 1951 Convention doesn’t have a provision about country of transit, safe third country, or first country of asylum. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is very specific about who is and who is not a refugee, including people who would ordinarily be refugees (i.e. having fled persecution) but for whatever reason should not be considered refugees. The 1969 OAU Convention mirrors the 1951 Convention in this respect, although provides a wider definition of who should ordinarily be considered a refugee.

The Convention enumerates a number of conditions whereby refugee status would cease to exist (Article 1(c)):  voluntarily re-availaing oneself of the protection of one’s nationality; re-acquiring nationality after having lost it; acquiring a new nationality that offers protection; voluntarily re-establishing oneself in the country of persecution;  or if the circumstances which precipitated flight no longer exist. Article 1(D) indicates that those under the mandate of a different UN organization (i.e. UNRWA for Palestine refugees) are not under UNHCR’s protection, and article 1(F) enumerates the people who do not deserve refugee status, i.e. for having committed serious non-political crimes prior to flight, commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity. These lists are exhaustive, meaning that these – and only these – criteria may be applied in determining that someone should not be granted refugee status even though they otherwise meet the definition of refugee.

The text of Article 1(E) reads as follows:

“E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.”

This article sets the standard at rights and obligations equal to those of nationals of the country, which is an important qualification especially in our discussion on what constitutes “sufficient protection”. Such refugees as have rights and obligations equal to those of nationals could be considered to have obtained a durable solution even if they have not obtained the nationality. A strict reading of this article would imply, however, that in order to be considered a durable solution under this Article, a refugee would have to have the kind of rights such as be able to vote, own property, perform compulsory military service, and have a right to re-admission – elements that are frequently restricted for non-nationals irrespective of whether other rights, i.e. to education, health, equal treatment, etc., are on an equal footing.

What about other sources of law?

There is no article relating to “safe third country” or “first country of asylum” in the Refugee Convention. Although there is no specific provision in the 1951 Refugee Convention that would allow a State to decide that our dear refugee from country A should have sought asylum in country B and therefore is not entitled to refugee status in country C, a number of countries have come up with various arrangements by which they wish to extricate themselves from the responsibility of assessing the asylum claim and granting refugee status to refugees. These endeavours have been reflected in subsequent so-called “soft law”  initiatives (such as Agenda for Protection and Convention Plus) as well as ExCom conclusions, including Conclusion No. 58 (XL) (1989) on Refugees and Asylum Seekers Who Move in an Irregular Manner From a Country in Which They Had Already Found Protection, which elaborates circumstances where a refugee might be returned to a country where they had already had asylum, provided that he or she can enter and remain there with full protection and access to a durable solution.

But these Conclusions and initiatives, for example, do not provide grounds for refugee status to be rejected in country C on the basis of previously having applied for asylum or stayed (for an unspecified amount of time) in country B; rather, they establish circumstances whereby country C would ensure that our refugee from country A can actually be readmitted and live in country B.

Non-refoulement – the principle of non return to a place where a person could be subjected to persecution, torture or ill treatment – is the cornerstone of international refugee law and is considered a principle of customary international law, beyond being enshrined in a number of international instruments such as the 1951 convention, the Convention Against Torture, etc. Non-refoulement still applies to any country having effective (de facto or de jure) control over persons OR territory (Australia, we are looking at you). If a person is returned to a country where he or she fears persecution it constitutes refoulement, but States are also responsible if they return a person to a country (country B) which then returns them to a country where they face persecution (so-called “chain refoulement“).

 

EU law

EU law relating to asylum within the Common European Asylum System is regulated by a number of directives, notably the recast Qualification Directive (QD), the recast Dublin Regulation (DR), and the EU recast Asylum Procedures Directive (APD). We are presuming, in our examples, that our fictional refugee from country A, who at one time was in non-EU* country B,  is now applying for asylum in EU country C.

* some EU legislation related to refugees may also apply to non-member states such as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland who apply i.e. the Dublin Regulations and Schengen but not necessarily other elements of the Common European Asylum System and are not necessarily bound by it. The Dublin Regulation regulates how asylum applications are to be handled if Countries B and C are both EU members or subject to the Dublin Regulations (EU + Norway, Iceland, Switzerland).

First country of asylum, according to Article 35 of the APD, refers to a refugee who has (already) received refugee status/durable solution in a previous country before applying for asylum in a different country – refugee from country A receives refugee status in country B before later leaving non-EU* country B and seeking asylum in EU* country C. According to EU law, the person has to have been recognized OR enjoy “sufficient protection” (more on that later); the person must be readmitted to that country; and the person has the right to rebut the presumption of a first country of asylum. Furthermore, EU* country C may (but is not required to), “take into account” a series of criteria (article 38) about how safe country non-EU* country B is.

Safe third country, according to Article 38 of the APT, has our fictional refugee A passing through non-EU country B – where she or he has not claimed asylum, or has claimed asylum but with no result – to EU country C where she or he then claims asylum. Again, Country B would need to agree to re-admit the person; there should be access to an asylum procedure  in accordance with the 1951 Convention and treatment in accordance with international law, especially protection from physical harm and refoulement, and protection of life and liberty.  Additionally to these provisions, the refugee ought to have a meaningful link to the country, which, according to UNHCR, should be more profound than a simple transit through country B.

Sufficient protection

Within EU refugee law, a refugee who is considered to have enjoyed “sufficient protection” in country B ought to return and be recognized there as a refugee (Article 35 APD). The text, however, does not define this “sufficient protection”, and only suggests that States look at the criteria in Article 38 withiut requiring them to apply these standards. Let’s take a look at Article 38 APD:

APD: Article 38 – The concept of a safe third country

1. Member States may apply the safe third country concept only where the competent authorities are satisfied that a person seeking international protection will be treated in accordance with the following principles in the third country concerned:

(a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;

(b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU;

(c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is respected;

(d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and

(e) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

Although (b) above seems to closely mirror the refugee definition found in the 1951 Convention (a refugee is a person outside of their country of origin with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group and who is unable/unwilling to return), it should be noted that UNHCR has held that persecution – while not explicitly defined – encompasses fear of life and liberty but also fear of violation of other fundamental rights. Concievably, therefore, country B could violate some fundamental rights (like expression of religion or gender identity, to name two) without running afoul of this clause. Some of this “gap” is covered by the concept of “serious harm” according to the Qualification Directive (part (c) above, but it is conceviable that some gap exists. Theoretically, Article 38 is not itself meant to be grounds for refugee status, but is meant to determine if our asylum country B is suitable for our refugee, and should be rebuttable, such that our refugee ought to be able to highlight any “gaps” that would impact him or her personally, or if for another reason our refugee would face harm in country B that they would not face if given asylum in country C.

UNHCR’s opinion on the matter, according to brief on the legal considerations of the EU-Turkey deal:

According to UNHCR, it therefore follows from the text, context and object and purpose of Article 35 that ‘sufficient protection’ goes beyond protection from refoulement. In UNHCR’s view, ‘sufficient protection’ requires that protection in the first country of asylum is effective and available in law and practice,  allowing the person who has enjoyed asylum in a previous state to reavail him- or herself of that protection. This includes a number of critical elements:

– no risk of persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Convention or serious harm in the previous state;

– no risk of onward refoulement from the previous state;

– compliance, in law and practice, of the previous state with relevant international refugee and human rights standards, including adequate standards of living, work rights, health care and education;

– access to a right of legal stay;

– assistance of persons with specific needs;

– timely access to a durable solution

Although these criteria and circumstances are supposed to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, part of the problem is a continued exclusive focus on the legal regime (i.e. within the law, does the person have protection from refoulement, access to legal stay, etc.) with less emphasis on a qualitative analysis that ought to be just as important. The qualitative analysis must analyze if the protections exist only on paper or also in practice.

There is a substantial difference between treatment equal to that afforded to nationals (as per Article 1(E) of the 1951 Convention) and the rights/obligations of refugees as described in the 1951 Convention. Quite a number of the rights or treatment afforded to refugees under the 1951 Convention are limited or restricted in some manner.

In our previous discussion on some of the qualitative elements of “enjoying” asylum,  we note that the 1951 Refugee Convention states a number of rights and privileges to which refugees should have access – rights to things like employment, education, and documentation– but many of these rights, at least as written in the Convention, indicate that refugees should have rights comparable to those of other foreigners, and only in some limited cases should refugees enjoy rights on equal footing to nationals.  Rights to employment and family life, as well as freedom of movment, are frequently restricted or the subject of reservations to the Convention. In a previous post, we also looked at how the Convention handles rights to primary education, wage-earning employment and self employment. Even if rights to education or employment or access to justice exist on paper, they must also exist in practice, not only theoretically.

Finally, UNHCR has noted that the receiving country – in our example, country B – should give timely access to a durable solution. Which is an important point to note – very few countries outside of Europe and North America offer any kind of durable solution or permanent status attached to refugee status. Many refugee-hosting countries, in addition to specific legal restrictions, have a general regime (legal, assistance) predicated on the concept that refugees are temporary, and should not (and will not) become permanent members of society. If, in the end, this is the major qualitative difference between an EU country and a Country B where legal protections are afforded but no durable solution is in sight, it is a substantial difference indeed.

Safe third country” in application: the EU-Turkey deal

In conclusion, a country will have to meet a pretty high standard in terms of legal rights and treatment before it ought to be considered a “safe country” offering “sufficient protection”. Critics of the EU-Turkey deal have noted substantial shortcomings in both the legal  and administrative regime in Turkey which would indicate that Turkey should not be considered as offering “sufficient protection” as a “safe country”. More serious allegations against Turkey specifically include claims that Turkey is massively failing the basic metric of ensuring legal status and, most seriously, allegations that Turkey has refouled refugees back to countries of persecution. Others have noted that the deal jeopardizes refugees’ right to seek asylum, as Turkey is not a member of the EU, so additional protections according to European Human Rights Law are not available to refugees in Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey also has a reservation to the 1951 Convention which excludes non-Europeans from falling under Turkey’s obligations. Limited capacity in both Greece and Turkey to conduct asylum interviews and ensure treatment in accordance with national and international laws is also a concern.

In addition, numerous criticisms highlight shortfalls of the Greek asylum system that could lead to violations of rights of refugees and asylum-seekers there, both in terms of whether Greece itself offers “sufficient protection” and whether its asylum system can ensure respect for the human and administrative rights due to refugees and asylum seekers under EU law. If refugees and asylum-seekers are not afforded individual consideration, interview and analysis, and are not afforded an opportunity to object, on an individual basis for specific reasons, to their return to Turkey, it would not be in accordance with the APD. The result could be that some people who have a specific good reason to not want to be returned to Turkey (i.e. LGBTI refugees) will not be adequately assessed, nor their administrative protections as per EU law upheld. Weaknesses in the Greek asylum were already considered severe when the European Court of Human Rights suspended returns to Greece under the Dublin Regulations (which ordinarily stipulate that an asylum claim be assessed in the first participating country where the fingerprints are taken) in 2011, prior to the currrent situation which has been widely reported as inefficient and ineffective. Human Rights Watch has alleged that the EU-Turkey deal has resulted in thousands being trapped in Greece for a year with no effective access to an asylum system at all.

 

Conditions in Greece, 2017. Photo: National Hearald

 

Links and references:

• Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for Law and Practice – Detailed Research on Key Asylum Procedures Directive Provisions, UNHCR, March 2010, p. 290-291
• Legal considerations on the return of asylum-seekers and refugees from Greece to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis under the safe third country and first country of asylum concept, UNHCR, 23 March 2016
• Common European Asylum System, European Commission website

• European Union: Council of the European Union, Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), 29 June 2013, OJ L. 180/60 -180/95; 29.6.2013, 2013/32/EU (“APD”).

• Refugee Law reader:
  • UNHCR, ‘Global Consultations on International Protection, Background paper no 1: Legal and practical aspects of the return of persons not in need of protection’, May 2001.
  • UNHCR, ‘Global Consultations on International Protection, Background paper no 2: The application of the “safe third country” notion and its impact on the management of flows and on the protection of refugees’, May 2001.
  • UNHCR, ‘Global Consultations on International Protection, Background paper no 3: Inter-State agreements for the re-admission of third country nationals, including asylum seekers, and for the determination of the State responsible for examining the substance of an asylum claim’, May 2001.
  • UNHCR, ’Guidance Note on bilateral and/or multilateral transfer arrangements of asylum-seekers’, May 2013.
  • UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, March 2010, in Section VI.2.4.3.
  • UNHCR, Summary Conclusions on the Concept of “Effective Protection” in the Context of Secondary Movements of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers (Lisbon Expert Roundtable, 9-10 December 2002), February 2003
  • M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Grand Chamber, European Court of Human Rights, 21 January 2011 (see Section V.1.2).

On the EU-Turkey deal specifically:

• Turkey as a Safe Third Country? Orçun Ulusoy, Border Criminologies blog, Oxford University Faculty of Law
• Analysis Why Turkey is Not a “Safe Country” Emanuela Roman, Theodore Baird, and Talia Radcliffe, Statewatch, February 2016
• Athens given deadline as EU looks to send more refugees back to Greece, The Guardian, February 2016
• Turkey ‘safe country’ sham revealed as dozens of Afghans forcibly returned hours after EU refugee deal, Amnesty International, March 2016
• The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, Elizabeth Collett, Migration Policy Institute Europe, March 2016
• Greece: Asylum Seekers Locked Up: Wretched Conditions for People in Need, Human Rights Watch, April 2016
• EU’s reckless refugee returns to Turkey illegal, Amnesty International, June 2016
• No safe refuge: Asylum-seekers and refugees denied effective protection in Turkey, Amnesty International, June 2016
• Five reasons why the EU Turkey deal still is not a good idea, Norwegian Refugee Council, September 2016
• EU-Turkey Deal: Violation of, or Consistency with, International Law? Jenny Poon, European Papers, December 2016
• Where did the money go? How Greece fumbled the refugee crisis, The Guardian, 9 March 2017
• Greece: A Year of Suffering for Asylum Seekers: EU-Turkey Deal Traps People in Abuse and Denies Them Refuge, Human Rights Watch, May 2017

 

News roundup: EU Turkey deal faltering, Jordan-Syria border no-man’s land, returnees from Afghanistan

Erdogan says Europe not ready to face 3mn refugees as EU-Turkey deal collapse looms

The Turkish president issued a veiled threat to unleash a wave of refugees on Europe as EU officials warn of a potential collapse of the union’s deal with Ankara, which has curbed the flow of refugees across the Aegean Sea. Speaking to Al Jazeera, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Turkey is currently hosting three million refuges on its territory and that if they all marched into Europe, the Europeans would not know what to do with them. He also reminded them that under the terms of Turkey’s refugee deal with the EU, the union pledged to provide six billion euros in aid over the course of several years. “As far as I can remember, until now the EU had only given 250-300 million Euros to Turkey so far,” he said. The veiled threat comes days after several officials in Europe voiced concern that the EU has no contingency plan for a collapse of the Turkish deal.

Syria-Jordan border: 75,000 refugees trapped in desert no man’s land in dire conditions

Video footage and satellite images showing makeshift grave sites and burial mounds offer a rare glimpse inside a desert no man’s land between Jordan and Syria where tens of thousands of refugees who have been virtually cut off from humanitarian aid for two months are stranded, said Amnesty International.

The video footage was obtained from Tribal Council of Palmyra and Badia, which has a network of activists operating inside the area known as the berm, and independently verified using satellite imagery.

Rich nations’ self-interest means refugee crisis set to get worse, not better

Amnesty has a (perhaps not particularly recent) but compelling denunciation, “Rich nations’ self-interest means refugee crisis set to get worse, not better”, lambasting countries who send refugees back to conflict zones (Kenya, we’re looking at you; but also Pakistan, Iran and Jordan), those who leave refugees to wallow in misery and/or limbo (Myanmar, Malaysia, Australia and the EU under fire here), and the dangerous routes that refugees take in their flight to freedom in Southeast Asia, Central America and, more famously, the Mediterranean.   [see the full article]

South Sudan Crisis Strains Uganda’s Exemplary Refugee Welcome

Uganda is celebrated around the world for providing refugees with the land and resources to become self-sufficient. But war in South Sudan is putting pressure on that model, leaving the most vulnerable struggling to survive, reports Carolyn Thompson from Uganda.

[…] Inyani fled from neighboring South Sudan in July after being mistaken for a rebel while going to pay his children’s school fees in the town of Nimule. The 30-year-old was arrested and beaten by a group of men in uniform, his arms tied behind his back while he was hit with sticks and rammed in the chest with guns.

He was released after the mistake was realized, but decided his family needed to leave the country. He, his wife, his two daughters and his son piled on to a small motorbike and drove from their hometown of Lao to the Ugandan border, about 22 miles (35 kilometers) away.

His family are now among more than 250,000 South Sudanese refugees who have flooded into Uganda since renewed clashes between government and opposition forces broke out in July. That is more than seven times the number who fled to Uganda during the entire first half of this year. By October, more than a million South Sudanese were displaced – with Uganda hosting the highest number by far.

 

Afghanistan May Have to Accommodate 1.5 Million Refugees in 2016

Afghanistan will reportedly take in more than 1.5 million Afghan refugees by the end of the year, challenging the government at a time when Kabul is already struggling against resurgent Taliban militants and an emerging Islamic State group (IS).

Based on figures compiled by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), some 20 percent of Afghanistan’s population already are former refugees known as “returnees.” Many of them, along with internally displaced Afghans and Afghans living in “refugee like” conditions, are part of a group of people the United Nations calls “people of concern.” The U.N. says this group of people has grown by 33 percent in 2015, and numbers more than 1.7 million people who are in desperate need of assistance.

The Dadaab saga continues: not-so-voluntary repatriation and no support

(Photo Ashley Hamer, Al Jazeera)

Since our last post on Daadab, there have been a few updates:

• Most Somalis do not want to return
• UNHCR and Kenya claims they do and Kenya is trying to send them anyways
• There is little to no support for those who decide to return
• The return and closure of Dadaab has been highly criticized by organisations such as MSF and Amnesty
• The Kenyan High Court will hear a petition on the closure on Nov 7.

Stay tuned!

Gallery: 25 years of Dadaab

 

Kenya: High Court to hear petition against closure of Dadaab refugee camp

The petition, filed by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and Kituo Cha Sheria, seeks to have the government’s closure decisions declared unconstitutional.

“The closure of Dadaab would be a disaster for the tens of thousands of refugees still living there who have nowhere else to go. Their repatriation back to Somalia is not voluntary – they are being forced to return when the conditions that forced them to flee in the first place have not improved,” said Michelle Kagari, deputy director of Amnesty International’s East Africa regional office.

“We hope that this court action will prompt the Kenyan authorities to reconsider their decision, and uphold their international obligations to protect refugees.”

The Kenyan government announced on 6 May that it was disbanding the Department of Refugee Affairs with immediate effect, and would close the camp on 30 November 2016, repatriating the more than 260,000 Somali refugees there to Somalia despite the immense risks they would face.

 

 

Refugee Returns from Kenya to Somalia: “This is About Fear… Not About Choice”

The Kenyan government’s threat to close the Dadaab refugee camp by the end of November would not only endanger the lives of several hundred thousand Somali refugees but has already caused irreparable harm and damage.

With no alternative options, some refugees have been coerced into repatriating to Somalia, where insecurity and an ongoing humanitarian crisis continue. The United Nations Refugee Agency’s focus on expediting the pace of returns – through a program that is supported by donors and implemented in partnership with non-governmental organizations – in the face of political pressure from Kenya, promotes large-scale returns that are unlikely to be sustainable. Development and reintegration initiatives in designated areas of return in Somalia need time to take hold; and, in the meantime, support for Somali refugees who remain in Kenya cannot be abandoned.

 

Somali Refugees Decry Empty Promises Upon Return From Dadaab Camp

The majority of the returnees are women, children, the elderly and the disabled – “the most vulnerable sectors of society,” according to The American Refugee Committee, an aid group providing some health care and child protection in the camps.

Yet there is very limited health care for the returnees living in the camps, and medical care in Kismayo town is expensive. The camps have few decent running water sources or latrines, leaving thousands of people at risk of disease.

Families arriving in Kismayo discover a fragile town with little infrastructure that cannot provide basic food and shelter, let alone facilitate their resettlement in Somalia.

 

Refugees stranded in Somalia after Kenya eviction: Somalis are returning to Kismayo in a “voluntary” process to a homeland still stricken by war, drought, and hardship.

He said he felt forced to return to Somalia because of food and healthcare cuts in Dadaab last year, and because of threats from the Kenyan authorities, he told Al Jazeera, seated on a plastic chair in the sand, a crowd of fellow returnees gathering around him.

Abukar knew the situation in Kismayo would be worse than Dadaab. He suspected there would be scant help for the returnees and he knew his country was still at war.

Nevertheless, the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) has spent much of 2016 trucking and flying thousands of Somalis back into their country as part of a “voluntary repatriation” agreement between that organisation, the Kenyan government, and the fledgling federal government of Somalia.

Between December 2014, a year after the repatriation agreement was reached, and September 2016, a total of 30,731 Somali refugees from Dadaab went through the voluntary return process, according to UNHCR statistics.

[…]

In early September, however, Jubaland state authorities called a halt to the returns process.

“We are overwhelmed … The returning of these refugees [from Dadaab] is neither safe, secure and definitely not dignified,” said Adam Ibrahim Aw Hirsi, Jubaland state’s justice minister.

“Families of five or six are living outside with their children, there are no schools, there is no food, not even basic hygiene like drinkable water, no toilets. Some are sick, some elderly and some are very young.”

Hirsi said the returnees are being misled by UNHCR and Somalia’s federal government with false promises of support to start a new life, when in reality little has been prepared for their sustainable resettlement and Jubaland is not ready to receive them.

 

 

 

Kenya: Dadaab Crisis – Refugees’ Fears Are Real, Says MSF

Humanitarian group, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) has called on the Kenyan government and the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) to urgently consider alternative arrangements, as the closure of the world’s largest refugee camp, Dadaab, draws near.

This came as a report released by the group recently, revealed that at least eight out of 10 refugees indicated that they did not want to return to their home states, citing among other concerns, forced recruitment, sexual violence and lack of healthcare as their main concerns.

“This decision is yet another blight on refugee protection globally, where again we see a total failure to provide safe haven for people in danger. The UN itself has recently declared that five million people are at risk of hunger inside Somalia. Sending back even more people to suffer is both inhumane and irresponsible,” says Bruno Jochum, MSF General Director.

Govt rejects MSF report on Dadaab refugees

The government has repudiated a report by medical charity group MSF that claimed 86 per cent of refugees at Dadaab do not want to leave. Interior ministry spokesman Mwenda Njoka said there are “serious doubts” about the figures because UN refugee agency UNHCR itself has found that most want to go back home.

“UNHCR has found many refugees are willing to leave. We are just constrained by lack of funding and that is why the repatriation has been slow.

“These findings are part of these organisation’s self-interests to continue having a presence in Dadaab and earn big salaries….,” he said.

But the medical charity group, which runs a hospital at the camp, on Friday defended its findings saying they were within the range of reports by UNHCR which had previously stated that just a quarter of the refugee population were ready to return.

From Dadaab to Despair: what now for this so-called “voluntary” return to Somalia

Did you know that the third-largest city in Kenya is a refugee camp? Did you know that some of the the residents of that camp have been there for three generations?  Did you know that now they are going “home”, a place most of them have only heard of, whether they like it or not?

Welcome to the largest refugee camp in the world: Daadab, a place where  1,000 babies are born every month, but only 2,000 leave each year. Dadaab was built in 1992 for 90,000 refugees fleeing the war in Somalia. Today it is home to an estimated half a million people, 350,000 of them registered refugees – “an urban area the size of Bristol, Zurich or New Orleans.” It is now considered the largest refugee camp in the world.

Conditions are difficult at best: “The residents cannot work and cannot leave. Permanent structures are forbidden: there must be no bricks, no concrete, no power lines; no proper roads, no sanitation, no drainage and no toilets.The half a million inmates use pit latrines for toilets, and there is a shortage of 35,000.”

But the camp should not be seen only as a burden on Kenyan society: despite Kenya’s strict encampment policy, a report commissioned by the governments of Norway, Denmark and Kenya in 2010 found that the camps’ businesses generated an annual turnover of $25m (£17.5m). The host community earned $1.8m from the sale of livestock alone to refugees.And the camp itself has its own economy and elections, where “these days, in the market, you can buy everything from an iPhone to an ice-cream.” Nevertheless, the government resists any constructions that “looked too much like real houses”, and it has torn down illegal power lines; refugees are not allowed to work, even if they manage to obtain diplomas.

Despite strong reasons why Kenya may wish to consider local integration, in reality few durable solutions are available, as Kenya does not allow local integration in any meaningful sense, and with extremely limited resettlement opportunities – only 43,000 departures of Somalis from Kenya since 2003 – refugees in Dadaab are essentially trapped if they are unwilling to return to Somalia.

The end of an era?

And now, after 25 years, Dadaab may close.

In 2013, Kenya, Somalia and the refugee agency UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement which would have facilitated refugees voluntarily move to Somalia followed by a pilot programme in 2014-2015 in which around 2,500 people returned to Somalia. As UNHCR describes it,

On 2 April 2015, Al-Shabaab militants launched an attack on the University College of Garissa in Kenya, killing 148 Kenyan students. In the aftermath of the attack, the political leaders of Kenya’s North Eastern Region called for the closure of the Dadaab camps, and a number of senior Government officials called for UNHCR to repatriate all Somali refugees in Dadaab to Somalia. However, after a series of démarches reaffirming the voluntariness of the repatriation process, Kenya, Somalia and UNHCR jointly reaffirmed their commitment to a coordinated and humane return process in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement. To this end, the Tripartite Commission was formally launched on 21 April 2015 to oversee the implementation of the Agreement

In May 2016, the Kenyan government announced plans to speed up the repatriation of Somali refugees and close the Dadaab camp in northeastern Kenya by November. Kenyan authorities, with officials from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), then stepped up a 2013 “voluntary” repatriation program.

Defining the terms: “voluntary repatriation”

Voluntary repatriation is defined as the “return in safety and in dignity to the country of origin” and re-availment of national protection. In order for the return to be voluntary, refugees must be genuinely free choice about whether to return and be fully informed about conditions in their home country

According to Human Rights Watch, returns under the ongoing program amount to refoulement, because they are neither voluntary nor fully informed decisions:

Refugees said the government’s decision to close the Dadaab camp had left them feeling trapped. They are afraid to return to Somalia, but also afraid of being arrested and deported if they stay in Dadaab until the November deadline. Many have therefore chosen to take US$400 in cash as part of a UNHCR-returns assistance package because they believe that if they don’t, they will be summarily deported later this year with nothing.

HRW alleges that the Kenyan authorities are insisting on closing the camp, irrespective of whether any refugees wish to stay, are cutting rations in an effort to encourage or force refugees to opt for the repatriation “package” which includes $400 and 3 months’ food rations, and are not being honest about the situation in Somalia. HRW also pointed out that UNHCR’s information regarding Somalia is not correct, or is at odds with other information published by UNHCR:

UNHCR-Somalia officials acknowledged to Human Rights Watch that their assessments indicate that conditions in south-central Somalia are not conducive to mass refugee returns in safety and dignity. UNHCR’s latest assessment in May found: “Civilians continue to be severely affected by the conflict, with reports of civilians being killed and injured in conflict-related violence, widespread sexual and gender-based violence against women and children, forced recruitment of children, and large-scale displacement.”

The information that UNHCR provides to refugees in Dadaab seeking to make an informed choice about returning, however, is mostly superficial and out of date, and sometimes misleading, Human Rights Watch said.

UNHCR “shares some of the concerns” recently raised by Human Rights Watch but did not specifically endorse the allegations.

Returns: but where to?

In August 2016, Kenya decided to “hold back its decision to close Daadab camp until peace in Somalia is restored,”  and although refugee verification exercise is complete, the process of repatriation may take longer given the security situation in Somalia.

Also in August, “Authorities in southern Somalia say they have blocked Somali refugees returning from Kenya because the refugees do not get the humanitarian support they need once they reach major cities.” Returnees are given a cash grant and transportation, but they are returning to areas where adequate shelter, food, and water do not exist, not to mention educational and medical facilities already overstretched with IDPs sheltering in those areas.

Following HRW’s allegations in September 2016 that Kenya is harassing and intimidating Somali refugees to return home when it is not safe to do so, Kenya rejected the allegations nevertheless reaffirmed on Thursday its plan to close the camp by November.

As a recent op-ed described it,

“It is impossible to call what is happening “voluntary” by any definition of the word. Yet both Kenya and UNHCR persist in doing so. This is a betrayal of the refugees and a dangerous precedent. Now, other countries in the region want their own tripartite agreement. Kenya has shown how to push UNHCR into a corner and close a refugee camp in the absence of any of the normal criteria for doing so. Europe and the United States, having abrogated any moral high ground on protecting refugees, are easily shamed by Kenya into pledging money toward the returns process, lending weight and momentum to the farce.”

 

 Read the full HRW report: Kenya: Involuntary Refugee Returns to Somalia:  Camp Closure Threat Triggers Thousands Returning to Danger, Human Rights Watch, 14 September 2016.

 

 

Los Desaprecidos: Enforced disappearances, a crime without end

“Many of the victims were so weak from torture and detention that they had to be helped aboard the plane. Once in flight, they were injected with a sedative by an Argentine Navy doctor before two officers stripped them and shoved them to their deaths. […] He estimated that the navy conducted the flights every Wednesday for two years, 1977 and 1978, and that 1,500 to 2,000 people were killed. ” (New York Times, 1995)

Today is International Day of the Disappeared, marking the tens or hundreds of people who have been abducted or killed and whose fates remain unknown. Enforced disappearances, forcible disappearances, or desaparecidos in Latin America –  where the concept first rose to prominence – refers to (in Article 2)

the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.

Enforced disappearances were a substantial feature of the Latin American dirty wars, with estimates of over 16,000 people disappeared in Peru, an estimated  30,000  in Argentina,  45,000 in Guatemala during the violence of the 1980s and 1990s, and estimates of 15,000 to 109,000 disappeared in Colombia. And it’s not just in Latin America; according to the International Centre for Transitional Justice,

The practice has been reported in more than 85 countries Sri Lanka is estimated to have had more than 30,000 cases since the 1980s, with similar numbers in Guatemala and Colombia for the same period. More recently in 2003 and 2004, Nepal is reported to have had the world’s highest number of new cases of disappearance. Successive al-Assad regimes in Syria have used disappearances as a tool of fear since the 1970s.In South Africa hundreds of activists went missing after being detained by apartheid security forces

In the case of Argentina,

The pattern was similar for those arrested. Many were taken from their homes in the middle of the night, tortured at clandestine detention centres and then disposed of. After years of investigations, it is thought that some bodies were destroyed with dynamite and others buried in unknown common graves, but the majority were thrown from planes into the Atlantic Ocean.

In addition, women who were pregnant were often forcibly separated from their children, with those children being given to military families for adoption. In Syria, “More than 65,000 people, most of them civilians, were forcibly disappeared between March 2011 and August 2015 and remained missing, Amnesty said, citing figures from the Syrian Network for Human Rights, a Syria-based monitoring group.”

Enforced disappearance is like a kidnapping or extrajudicial detention, and likely also torture and/or extrajudicial execution, but it has the features of being committed by State agents or with their acquiescence, and a denial of the whereabouts or the fate of the person concerned.  It’s not like the situation of persons missing during armed conflict or natural disaster, because the person was generally deliberately abducted by authorities who then refuse to acknowledge having the individuals. It’s its own crime, not just kidnapping, torture or killing, even if all of these things also happened.

Enforced disappearances are particularly horrific because the circumstances of the person remain unknown. And the crime continues – with both the disappeared individual as well as his or her family – for as long as there is no resolution. An enforced disappearance not only removes (percieved) political opponents, it avoids the evidence and the witnesses and the international outcry, as a tool to create a climate of terror among family members or other activists, who may be forced to bribe middlemen for information out of fear of approaching the State authorities directly.

‘Detainees were squeezed into overcrowded, dirty cells where disease was rampant and medical treatment unavailable, Amnesty said, while those imprisoned suffered torture through methods such as electric shocks, whipping, suspension, burning and rape. “People would die and then be replaced,” Salam Othman, who was forcibly disappeared from 2011 to 2014, was quoted as saying in the report. “I did not leave the cell for the whole three years, not once … Many people became hysterical and lost their minds.”’

 

On the human rights law side,  enforced disappearances constitute “a multiple human rights violation.” They violate the right to life, the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, the right to liberty and security of the person, and the right to a fair and public trial. These rights are set out in the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture. There is even a UN Declaration on Enforced Disappearances, an Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons  and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

A widespread or systematic pattern of enforced disappearances constitutes a crime against humanity according to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which provides that enforced disappearances are a crime against humanity “when committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” In some circumstances, enforced disappearances may also constitute a war crime:  The Geneva Conventions also stipulate that persons taken into custody (combatants or otherwise) must not be murdered or executed without trial, must have due process.

See also:

• Council of Europe: Commissioner for Human Rights, Missing persons and victims of enforced disappearance in Europe, March 2016
• UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) , Consideration of reports of States parties pursuant to article 29 of the Convention : [International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance] : reports of States parties pursuant to article 29, paragraph 1, of the Convention due in 2012 : Spain, 28 January 2013, CED/C/ESP/1
• Human Rights Watch, UAE: Enforced Disappearance and Torture, 14 September 2012
• International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Colombia: Disappearance, 10 July 2013
• Human Rights Watch, Mexico’s Disappeared: The Enduring Cost of a Crisis Ignored, 20 February 2013
• International Crisis Group (ICG), Disappeared: Justice Denied in Mexico’s Guerrero State, 23 October 2015, Latin America Report N°55

Cartographers for social equality: more on maps

The title, of course, is from a West Wing episode a long time ago, where the point is made that how things are visually represented goes a long way to influencing how we think about them.

So, the other day, we talked a little bit about maps, and specifically about cool GIS things that people are doing.And we’ve found some more interesting tools for you, in case you feel like doing mappy things on your own:

• the Humanitarian Data Exchange: Thousands of interesting maps as well as Common Operational Datasets. It has some interactive visualizations you can explore, which is how I made the map in the header in about 35 seconds, on displacement in S Sudan.
• Color Brewer 2: To get your style on, and check your color scheme for choropleth maps. There are options such as colorblind-friendly, photocopy-friendly, and print-friendly for all of us who have suffered the agony of producing a graphic illegible to a lot of people.
• Map Maker 4 is software for professionals who need to make maps; people like foresters, estate managers, archaeologists, emergency services, ecologists, and many others. It has been designed so that you do not have to be a “GIS” professional to use it.
• Cartographic Design Lab – how to create a choropleth map.
• UNHCR Emergency Information Management Toolkit has a lot of interesting links and resources, like delimiting AOR using Google Earth, map style guides, and other goodies.
• Humanitarian Response, Common and Fundamental Operational Datasets Registry
• Map Action: Field Guide to Humanitarian Mapping, First Edition, March 2009
• Standard symbol set from UNGIWG
• OCHA Map Guidelines: Field Map Production and Guidelines
• REACH Mapping Guidelines
• CartoBlog – lots of tutorials, such as a Tutorial on Choropleth maps with excel, Tutorial to collect for ArcGIS offline, and Social Media Mapping with ArcGIS Online
• UX Patterns for Maps: This site presents some design patterns for visualizing and scenarizing content with maps. Each pattern is associated with the problem(s) it solves. The patterns are being spotted and described on GitHub by a set of contributors.
• Carto courses:  Online Mapping for Beginners In this lesson, you will learn how to work with datasets to create interactive map visualizations. You will explore styling your map, adding multiple datasets, and experimenting with different ways to display your data, including animated maps. You’ll learn how to share your new visualizations with friends, family, and the world. See also: Intermediate map design

 

The human geography of displacement: mapping and profiling

One of the (many) challenges in responding to situations of displacement is that of information: knowing what and who is where, identifying resources and needs, and allocating resources. Coordination can be as simple as a 3W (who, what where), or be a complex or interactive tool. There is far, far more that can be said about coordination than can be summarized here. Instead, let’s look at some of the interesting initiatives that have combined maps and technology to map or profile the human geography of displacement.

 Some interesting story maps and discussions on mapping refugees:

• The Uprooted:ArcGIS story map: This is amazing. Click on this. Do it.

• Musings on Maps: Refugee Traffic Scars the Globe’s Surface: “What sort of stories does this simplified map simply omit?  The stories of those journeys are interrupted by death, while they are far smaller, of course remain absent:  the perilous trajectories of individuals fleeing Syria, Iraq, Africa, Indonesia, Afghanistan and Pakistan however risk not only their lives, but increasingly their legal status as they undertake huge geographic migrations in search of new homes elsewhere, traveling by boat, on foot, or along paths promised by human traffickers.  The sleek image, despite its attempted accuracy, shows the intensity of itineraries as embossed on the map as if to disfigure the notion of global unity that runs against the very narrative of global unity implicit in a iconic equidistant azimuthal projection centered on the North Pole which emphasized global harmony as World War II was tried to be forgotten, which as the official flag adopted by the United Nations adopted in October, 1947 promoted an image of global unity:”

• Martin Grandjean: What does the global map of refugees (really) look like? (see below)

 

Specific mapping and profiling projects

• Diseases and refugee camps (George Mason University, 2012) –  “Our initial focus is on the the Dadaab refugee camps which are located in Kenya, approximately 100 kilometers from the Somali border. The camps themselves are homes to roughly 500,000 people, with nearly 99% of the population coming from Somalia. Within the camps the mortality rate is ~ 0.44/10,000 per day with  diseases such as cholera and measles being among the causes of death.”

• Livelihood, security, and access to services among urban refugees in Delhi (JIPS) – The goal of the Stanford students` research project was to add spatial analysis capabilities in order to better identify and understand geographic patterns related to refugee security. A Livelihood Index score was calculated for each household, based on responses covering the four key components of livelihoods. This enabled to carry out a spatial analysis of the distribution of households with high living standards (scoring high in the Livelihood Index) and low living standards (scoring low) with respect to one another, ethnicity, and proximity to public services. Results from the spatial analysis suggested that proximity to services did not significantly correlate with higher living standard, suggesting that physical distance to services may not be the most important barrier for urban refugees. Finances, lack of mobility, or discrimination may play more significant roles in living standards. See the full, interactive study here!

Livelihoods, access to services among urban refugees in Delhi – JIPS

 

 

• Earth observation and GIS to support humanitarian operations in refugee/IDP camps – “Since 2011 we are providing Earth observation-based information services to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) on demand. A service on population monitoring has already reached an operational stage. Thereby indicators on population are derived by automated dwelling extraction from (multi-temporal) very high resolution (VHR) satellite imagery. Based on such information, further added-value products are provided to analyse internal camp structure or camp evolution. Two additional services to support groundwater extraction and assess the impact of the camps on the environment are currently under development. So far twenty-five sites in nine countries have been analysed and more than a hundred maps were provided to MSF and other humanitarian organisations.”

• Satellites Guide Aid Workers Sinking Water Wells For African Refugees (European Space Agency, 2004): Caring for more than 180,000 Sudanese refugees gathered in the desert landscape of eastern Chad, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has begun using satellite data to identify hidden water resources and site new camps.

 

Za’atri refugee camp, Jordan

 

• Syria Refugee Sites – “Data as of June 11, 2015. The “Syria Refugee Sites” dataset contains verified data about the geographic location (point geometry), name, and operational status of refugee sites hosting Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq. Only refugee sites operated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the Government of Turkey are included.”

• Using GIS as a planning and coordination tool in refugee camps in South Sudan – “The South Sudan refugee crisis has suffered from substantial information gaps, largely stemming from a lack of coordinated approaches to data collection and inadequate resources to operationalise such a data collection effort. In particular, shortcomings in the availability and reliability of data about patterns of refugee flows over the border, settlement area characteristics and overall social organisation have limited the speed and effectiveness of the humanitarian response. To address these gaps, REACH, in partnership with UNHCR, developed a simple methodology aimed at bringing together data from reliable sources and representing it in both text and geospatial formats, such as static and interactive webmaps.”

•  Informing Humanitarian Action with GIS in Al-Za’atari Camp – “Information about Al Za’atari collected by REACH is available on the open geo-portal Open Street Map. IS officers adjust data in to suit OSM by using JOSM and Mercaator software, a mapping platform commonly used by the digital humanitarians in emergency environments. Information is shared in a free map that can be viewed online or downloaded, although some information is protected due to its sensitive nature. Using OSM means that spatial data can be immediately available and therefore more effective in crisis situations when there is little time to construct more complex software. As part of its commitment to improve information management in emergencies, REACH has created an OSM wiki-page to explain how the data is structured and adjusted to the software so other humanitarian organisations can replicate the method elsewhere around the world. The REACH team in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is now following the Al Za’atari model for refugee camp mapping.”

• Using GIS technology to map shelter allocation in Azraq refugee camp (UNHCR Innovation) – “to allocate shelters, staff just had to navigate through a map of the camp to see which shelters had already been allocated, which ones were available, and how many people were living inside. Later on, the program would show additional data, such as whether the shelter had been damaged, or if it was occupied informally by another family. Staff only had to click on the desired shelter to allocate it, and the data would then feed directly into the progress file. What’s more, it only took an impressive 20 seconds to find the right key among 10,000.”

• GIS for Good: Siting refugee camps in Uganda – “The first objective of the project was to develop two separate scenarios for refugee campsite selection.
  Scenario 1: Existing Community Infrastructure, was designed such that the selection of sites would assume that refugees would be reliant on the community infrastructure that already exists.  This would provide refugees an opportunity to integrate with local communities to a certain extent, and put less pressure on UNHCR to develop the infrastructure for new camps in rapid crisis situations.
  Scenario 2: New Community Infrastructure, was designed under the assumption that UNHCR would be able to provide infrastructure to new camps.  Although both models aspire to a level of community integration, this model would be undertaken under the hope that the presence of UNHCR and thus, refugees, would actually benefit communities that had previously suffered from poor access to certain resources.  These camps might prove a bit more difficult to develop, but the hope is that the positive effects of a camp would benefit the communities for a long time to come.”

• What Makes a Camp Safe? The Protection of children from Abduction in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugee Camps– “The study is one of the first initiatives to generate a database of IDP and refugee camp attacks for analysis and policymaking purposes. The researchers also used geographic information systems (GIS) software to produce a series of maps that chart migration trends, camp attacks, and the abduction of children. A major advantage of GIS mapping is the ability to track the movement of IDP and refugee populations over time; this will allow Pitt researchers to continue to track population movements to determine whether migratory populations are at greater risk than those in permanent, stationary camps.”

 Other links:

• UNHCR Emergency Information Management Toolkit
• UNHCR Coordination Toolkit
• Joint IDP Profiling Service, an inter-agency service based in Geneva, to provide technical support to government, humanitarian and development actors seeking to improve their information about internally displaced populations
• Is Now the Moment the Humanitarian Data Revolution Begins? (Devex, June 2016)
• “Earth Observation-based Dwelling Detection Approaches in a Highly Complex Refugee Camp Environment: A Comparative Study,” Remote Sensing 6(10): 9277-9297 (Sept. 2014)
• Reach Initiative: Maps

 

 

Cash not stuff: humanitarian assistance of the future?

Header: Cash Atlas

The logic of providing cash assistance instead of stuff is pretty simple: it’s more efficient and more effective; it’s more accountable; and it allows recipients some sort of agency. Traditional aid is supposed to be needs based, but in the end is subject to global procurement contracts favoring economies of scale, earmarked funding by donors, and the whims of changing global priorities that may result in the distribution of items because they are in the warehouse whether or not the beneficiaries want or need them.

It’s more efficient, because it does not need to be packaged, shipped, and distributed. With low distribution costs, more of the money actually goes to the recipient. It’s more effective, because recipients of blankets or other non-food items may sell them to obtain what they really need (as anyone who has traveled in certain countries and seen the wide range of uses to which UNHCR plastic sheeting has been put). It’s more accountable, because anti-fraud safeguards can be built in, the assistance is attributed to a specific individual or family, and there could be less vulnerability to corruption related to procurement contracts that can plague humanitarian assistance (i.e. USAID suspending funds to major aid groups after finding corruption in Syrian aid pipeline). Finally, cash assistance recognizes that recipients have agency and should be able to decide for themselves what their most important needs are.

And interestingly, cash has impacts in the wider economy, since the money given to the beneficiary is then spent on goods and services in the host community. For example, in an evaluation of the cash assistance programme in Lebanon, the study noted that cash assistance “has significant multiplier effects on the local economy. Each dollar that beneficiaries spend generates 2.13 dollars of GDP for the Lebanese economy.”

Cash for everyone, right?

It’s not a one-size-fits-all solution nor a panacea, and there are a few preconditions necessary. As World Vision, one of many NGOs involved in provision of cash assistance, describes it, “The ability of cash transfers to deliver their promise fundamentally depends on whether or not they are calculated at a fair value and for a sufficient duration to accomplish the programme objectives. In short, cash transfers are neither a panacea for the global humanitarian financing gap nor a long-term solution to ending conflict, where 80% of humanitarian resources are currently directed.”

First of all, sufficient basic financial infrastructure or systems may be required:

“To realize a global scale-up in cash transfers, countries facing crises must have the necessary infrastructure and financial services in place to make payments safely and efficiently. E-payment mechanisms, including mobile-based money transfers and cardbased payments such as prepaid debit cards, are effective tools that enable efficient and scalable transfers, improve transparency, and mitigate fraud in humanitarian response. However, these tools are not present in all countries. E-payment tools are increasingly common, but as yet impractical in countries with weak digital and financial infrastructure, regulatory environments, and/ or financial institutions.”

Second, it requires the existence of markets with sufficient supply of basic necessities, which may not exist in remote locations or post-disaster areas.

Third, the programme needs to be designed in a way that mitigates risks of fraud (both in terms of selecting beneficiaries as well as technical protections such as iris scans at ATMs) or of protection vulnerabilities, and programme design will need to think carefully about how to ensure the most vulnerable of the population have access to the services. The targeting strategy will often have to take into consideration competing priorities in different sectors, particularly if the cash assistance is intended to be unconditional and multipurpose. And the programme design will have to consider if the cash assistance programme results in market distortions or inflated prices.

In a survey of available literature evaluating cash programmes, in terms of emowerment (relating to many themes that would often be characterized under the heading of “protection”), the study found that,

“The available evidence shows that transfers can reduce physical abuse of women by men, but also that they may increase non-physical abuse, such as emotional abuse or controlling behaviour. It supports both the theory that increased income lowers stress-related abuse and the theory that increased income enables the woman to bargain out of abuse. The relatively strong evidence that decision-making power increases for women in the beneficiary household also offers substance to this latter theory. Other evidence reveals that risky sexual behaviour and early marriage differ by gender, but for both girls/women and boys/men increased income to an extent lifts the constraints that drive engagement in these behaviours. In the case of women and girls, the evidence that directly or indirectly receiving a transfer reduces the likelihood of having multiple sexual partners indicates that cash transfers may reduce the incidence of relationships that are transactional. Taken together, the evidence in this section points to cash transfers having a positive impact on women’s choices as to fertility and engagement in sexual activity. In the case of men and boys, some of the evidence collected here suggests that cash transfers do not have the same effect of reducing risky sexual activity, and in fact may lead to an increase in this type of behaviour.”

Finally, there are factors such as duration of programme, amount of assistance, gender of main recipient, and timing and frequency of asistance all influence how successful the programme may be in terms of impacts in individual sectors.

Distribution of Non food items

But does it really do all it says on the tin?

Luckily, cash assistance being in fashion does mean that there are quite a lot of studies interested in measuring its effectiveness, usefulness, and everything else-ness that one could possibly want to measure.

But preliminary findings do indicate that cash assistance has positive impacts on poverty, education, savings, health, nutrition, and empowerment. Employment seems not to be substantially impacted by cash assistance. In the same study surveying available literature evaluating cash programmes, the study findings are as follows:

Monetary poverty

There is a comparatively large evidence base linking cash transfers to reductions in monetary poverty. The evidence extracted consistently shows an increase in total and food expenditure andreduction in Foster–Greer–Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures.

Education

Overall, the available evidence highlights a clear link between cash transfer receipt and increased school attendance. Less evidence and a less clear-cut pattern of impact is found for learning outcomes (as measured by test scores) and cognitive development outcomes (information processing ability, intelligence, reasoning, language development and memory), although,interestingly, the three studies reporting statistically significant findings on the latter all report improvements in cognitive development associated with cash transfer receipt.

Health and nutrition

Evidence of the impacts of cash transfers across all three indicator areas – use of health services, dietary diversity and anthropometric measures – was largely consistent in terms of direction of effect, showing improvements in the indicators. On the whole, the available evidence highlights how, while the cash transfers reviewed have played an important role in increasing the use of health services and dietary diversity, changes in design or implementation features, including complementary actions (e.g. nutritional supplements or behavioural change training), may be required to achieve greater and more consistent impacts on child anthropometric measures.

Savings, investment and production

Overall, impacts on savings, and on livestock ownership and/or purchase, as well as use and/or purchase of agricultural inputs, are consistent in their direction of effect, with almost all statistically significant findings highlighting positive effects of cash transfers, though these are not universal to all programmes or to all types of livestock and inputs. This is an important finding as, with the exception of one programme, none of the cash transfers analysed focuses explicitly on enhancing productive impacts. Impacts on borrowing, agricultural productive assets and business/enterprise are less clear-cut or are drawn from a smaller evidence base.

Employment

The evidence extracted for this review shows that for just over half of studies on adult work (participation and intensity), the cash transfer does not have a statistically significant impact. Among those studies reporting a significant effect among adults of working age, the majority find an increase in work participation and intensity. In the cases in which a reduction in work participation or work intensity is reported, these reflect a reduction in participation among the elderly, those caring for dependents, or they are the result of reductions in casual work.

Resources and specific studies:

• The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) maintains a database of studies and reports that are searchable by country, modality, sector, organization, etc.
• CaLP also has a lovely cash atlas, which is an interactive map/infographic of cash programmes
• UNHCR’s Interagency sharing portal, collecting resources and studies related to basic assistance in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey
• Cash Transfers: What Does the Evidence Say? A Rigorous Review of Impacts and the Role of Design and Implementation Features (ODI, July 2016)
• The Other Side of the Coin: The Comparative Evidence of Cash and In-Kind Transfers in Humanitarian Situations? (World Bank, June 2016)
• Emergency Economies: The Impact of Cash Assistance in Lebanon (IRC, August 2014)
• UNHCR Innovation: Biometric cash assistance
• The Economics of Humanitarian Aid: Are We on a Slippery Slope? (International Growth Centre Blog, June 2016)
• For Humanitarian Response, a Cash-based Payment Consensus (Devex, June 2016)
• A Case for Cash: Crisis and Disaster-affected Populations’ Perspective (Cash Learning Partnership)
• Cash Transfers in Humanitarian Contexts: Strategic Note (World Bank, April 2016)
• The surprisingly simple economic case for giving refugees cash, not stuff
• Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Operations (Transparency International, 2014)
• Risk and humanitarian cash transfer programming (ODI, October 2015)
• Doing cash differently:How cash transfers can transform humanitarian aid (ODI, September 2015)

Offshore Justice: could Australia end up at the ICC for abusing asylum-seekers? | Justice Hub

“This isn’t the first time that it has been suggested that the ICC examine allegations of abuses against asylum-seekers in Australian detention facilities. In 2014, Andrew Wilkie, an independent member of parliament, insisted that the Australian government was committing crimes against humanity against asylum-seekers and requested that the ICC investigate. Wilkie argued that the Australian government was guilty of imprisonment and other severe deprivations of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; deportation and other forcible transfer of population; and other international acts causing great suffering, or serious injury to body and mental and physical health.”

See the whole article here.

And see the documentary: