Tag Archives: Refugee law

International legal concept or convenient excuse? “First country of asylum” and “safe third country” concepts

Is there such a thing in International refugee law as “first country of asylum” and “safe third country” concepts?

(Featured image: reception conditions in Greece, January 2017, Photo: HRW)

Yes and no – and that depends a lot on the interpretation of what is meant by “international refugee law”. Both of these concepts – “first country of asylum” and “safe third country” are enshrined in EU refugee law but are not a part of the 1951 Convention or regional instruments such as the OAU convention or the Cartagena Declaration. Under International Refugee Law, there is no obligation to seek asylum at the first effective opportunity, and States retain their legal responsibility if they have effective control of persons or territory.

In our examples, we will frequently discuss situations in which a refugee from country A has passed through country B and is claiming asylum in country C.

What does the 1951 Convention say?

The 1951 Convention doesn’t have a provision about country of transit, safe third country, or first country of asylum. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is very specific about who is and who is not a refugee, including people who would ordinarily be refugees (i.e. having fled persecution) but for whatever reason should not be considered refugees. The 1969 OAU Convention mirrors the 1951 Convention in this respect, although provides a wider definition of who should ordinarily be considered a refugee.

The Convention enumerates a number of conditions whereby refugee status would cease to exist (Article 1(c)):  voluntarily re-availaing oneself of the protection of one’s nationality; re-acquiring nationality after having lost it; acquiring a new nationality that offers protection; voluntarily re-establishing oneself in the country of persecution;  or if the circumstances which precipitated flight no longer exist. Article 1(D) indicates that those under the mandate of a different UN organization (i.e. UNRWA for Palestine refugees) are not under UNHCR’s protection, and article 1(F) enumerates the people who do not deserve refugee status, i.e. for having committed serious non-political crimes prior to flight, commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity. These lists are exhaustive, meaning that these – and only these – criteria may be applied in determining that someone should not be granted refugee status even though they otherwise meet the definition of refugee.

The text of Article 1(E) reads as follows:

“E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.”

This article sets the standard at rights and obligations equal to those of nationals of the country, which is an important qualification especially in our discussion on what constitutes “sufficient protection”. Such refugees as have rights and obligations equal to those of nationals could be considered to have obtained a durable solution even if they have not obtained the nationality. A strict reading of this article would imply, however, that in order to be considered a durable solution under this Article, a refugee would have to have the kind of rights such as be able to vote, own property, perform compulsory military service, and have a right to re-admission – elements that are frequently restricted for non-nationals irrespective of whether other rights, i.e. to education, health, equal treatment, etc., are on an equal footing.

What about other sources of law?

There is no article relating to “safe third country” or “first country of asylum” in the Refugee Convention. Although there is no specific provision in the 1951 Refugee Convention that would allow a State to decide that our dear refugee from country A should have sought asylum in country B and therefore is not entitled to refugee status in country C, a number of countries have come up with various arrangements by which they wish to extricate themselves from the responsibility of assessing the asylum claim and granting refugee status to refugees. These endeavours have been reflected in subsequent so-called “soft law”  initiatives (such as Agenda for Protection and Convention Plus) as well as ExCom conclusions, including Conclusion No. 58 (XL) (1989) on Refugees and Asylum Seekers Who Move in an Irregular Manner From a Country in Which They Had Already Found Protection, which elaborates circumstances where a refugee might be returned to a country where they had already had asylum, provided that he or she can enter and remain there with full protection and access to a durable solution.

But these Conclusions and initiatives, for example, do not provide grounds for refugee status to be rejected in country C on the basis of previously having applied for asylum or stayed (for an unspecified amount of time) in country B; rather, they establish circumstances whereby country C would ensure that our refugee from country A can actually be readmitted and live in country B.

Non-refoulement – the principle of non return to a place where a person could be subjected to persecution, torture or ill treatment – is the cornerstone of international refugee law and is considered a principle of customary international law, beyond being enshrined in a number of international instruments such as the 1951 convention, the Convention Against Torture, etc. Non-refoulement still applies to any country having effective (de facto or de jure) control over persons OR territory (Australia, we are looking at you). If a person is returned to a country where he or she fears persecution it constitutes refoulement, but States are also responsible if they return a person to a country (country B) which then returns them to a country where they face persecution (so-called “chain refoulement“).

 

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EU law

EU law relating to asylum within the Common European Asylum System is regulated by a number of directives, notably the recast Qualification Directive (QD), the recast Dublin Regulation (DR), and the EU recast Asylum Procedures Directive (APD). We are presuming, in our examples, that our fictional refugee from country A, who at one time was in non-EU* country B,  is now applying for asylum in EU country C.

* some EU legislation related to refugees may also apply to non-member states such as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland who apply i.e. the Dublin Regulations and Schengen but not necessarily other elements of the Common European Asylum System and are not necessarily bound by it. The Dublin Regulation regulates how asylum applications are to be handled if Countries B and C are both EU members or subject to the Dublin Regulations (EU + Norway, Iceland, Switzerland).

First country of asylum, according to Article 35 of the APD, refers to a refugee who has (already) received refugee status/durable solution in a previous country before applying for asylum in a different country – refugee from country A receives refugee status in country B before later leaving non-EU* country B and seeking asylum in EU* country C. According to EU law, the person has to have been recognized OR enjoy “sufficient protection” (more on that later); the person must be readmitted to that country; and the person has the right to rebut the presumption of a first country of asylum. Furthermore, EU* country C may (but is not required to), “take into account” a series of criteria (article 38) about how safe country non-EU* country B is.

Safe third country, according to Article 38 of the APT, has our fictional refugee A passing through non-EU country B – where she or he has not claimed asylum, or has claimed asylum but with no result – to EU country C where she or he then claims asylum. Again, Country B would need to agree to re-admit the person; there should be access to an asylum procedure  in accordance with the 1951 Convention and treatment in accordance with international law, especially protection from physical harm and refoulement, and protection of life and liberty.  Additionally to these provisions, the refugee ought to have a meaningful link to the country, which, according to UNHCR, should be more profound than a simple transit through country B.

Sufficient protection

Within EU refugee law, a refugee who is considered to have enjoyed “sufficient protection” in country B ought to return and be recognized there as a refugee (Article 35 APD). The text, however, does not define this “sufficient protection”, and only suggests that States look at the criteria in Article 38 withiut requiring them to apply these standards. Let’s take a look at Article 38 APD:

APD: Article 38 – The concept of a safe third country

1. Member States may apply the safe third country concept only where the competent authorities are satisfied that a person seeking international protection will be treated in accordance with the following principles in the third country concerned:

(a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;

(b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU;

(c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is respected;

(d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and

(e) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

Although (b) above seems to closely mirror the refugee definition found in the 1951 Convention (a refugee is a person outside of their country of origin with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group and who is unable/unwilling to return), it should be noted that UNHCR has held that persecution – while not explicitly defined – encompasses fear of life and liberty but also fear of violation of other fundamental rights. Concievably, therefore, country B could violate some fundamental rights (like expression of religion or gender identity, to name two) without running afoul of this clause. Some of this “gap” is covered by the concept of “serious harm” according to the Qualification Directive (part (c) above, but it is conceviable that some gap exists. Theoretically, Article 38 is not itself meant to be grounds for refugee status, but is meant to determine if our asylum country B is suitable for our refugee, and should be rebuttable, such that our refugee ought to be able to highlight any “gaps” that would impact him or her personally, or if for another reason our refugee would face harm in country B that they would not face if given asylum in country C.

UNHCR’s opinion on the matter, according to brief on the legal considerations of the EU-Turkey deal:

According to UNHCR, it therefore follows from the text, context and object and purpose of Article 35 that ‘sufficient protection’ goes beyond protection from refoulement. In UNHCR’s view, ‘sufficient protection’ requires that protection in the first country of asylum is effective and available in law and practice,  allowing the person who has enjoyed asylum in a previous state to reavail him- or herself of that protection. This includes a number of critical elements:

– no risk of persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Convention or serious harm in the previous state;

– no risk of onward refoulement from the previous state;

– compliance, in law and practice, of the previous state with relevant international refugee and human rights standards, including adequate standards of living, work rights, health care and education;

– access to a right of legal stay;

– assistance of persons with specific needs;

– timely access to a durable solution

Although these criteria and circumstances are supposed to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, part of the problem is a continued exclusive focus on the legal regime (i.e. within the law, does the person have protection from refoulement, access to legal stay, etc.) with less emphasis on a qualitative analysis that ought to be just as important. The qualitative analysis must analyze if the protections exist only on paper or also in practice.

There is a substantial difference between treatment equal to that afforded to nationals (as per Article 1(E) of the 1951 Convention) and the rights/obligations of refugees as described in the 1951 Convention. Quite a number of the rights or treatment afforded to refugees under the 1951 Convention are limited or restricted in some manner.

In our previous discussion on some of the qualitative elements of “enjoying” asylum,  we note that the 1951 Refugee Convention states a number of rights and privileges to which refugees should have access – rights to things like employment, education, and documentation– but many of these rights, at least as written in the Convention, indicate that refugees should have rights comparable to those of other foreigners, and only in some limited cases should refugees enjoy rights on equal footing to nationals.  Rights to employment and family life, as well as freedom of movment, are frequently restricted or the subject of reservations to the Convention. In a previous post, we also looked at how the Convention handles rights to primary education, wage-earning employment and self employment. Even if rights to education or employment or access to justice exist on paper, they must also exist in practice, not only theoretically.

Finally, UNHCR has noted that the receiving country – in our example, country B – should give timely access to a durable solution. Which is an important point to note – very few countries outside of Europe and North America offer any kind of durable solution or permanent status attached to refugee status. Many refugee-hosting countries, in addition to specific legal restrictions, have a general regime (legal, assistance) predicated on the concept that refugees are temporary, and should not (and will not) become permanent members of society. If, in the end, this is the major qualitative difference between an EU country and a Country B where legal protections are afforded but no durable solution is in sight, it is a substantial difference indeed.

Safe third country” in application: the EU-Turkey deal

In conclusion, a country will have to meet a pretty high standard in terms of legal rights and treatment before it ought to be considered a “safe country” offering “sufficient protection”. Critics of the EU-Turkey deal have noted substantial shortcomings in both the legal  and administrative regime in Turkey which would indicate that Turkey should not be considered as offering “sufficient protection” as a “safe country”. More serious allegations against Turkey specifically include claims that Turkey is massively failing the basic metric of ensuring legal status and, most seriously, allegations that Turkey has refouled refugees back to countries of persecutionOthers have noted that the deal jeopardizes refugees’ right to seek asylum, as Turkey is not a member of the EU, so additional protections according to European Human Rights Law are not available to refugees in Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey also has a reservation to the 1951 Convention which excludes non-Europeans from falling under Turkey’s obligations. Limited capacity in both Greece and Turkey to conduct asylum interviews and ensure treatment in accordance with national and international laws is also a concern.

In addition, numerous criticisms highlight shortfalls of the Greek asylum system that could lead to violations of rights of refugees and asylum-seekers there, both in terms of whether Greece itself offers “sufficient protection” and whether its asylum system can ensure respect for the human and administrative rights due to refugees and asylum seekers under EU law. If refugees and asylum-seekers are not afforded individual consideration, interview and analysis, and are not afforded an opportunity to object, on an individual basis for specific reasons, to their return to Turkey, it would not be in accordance with the APD. The result could be that some people who have a specific good reason to not want to be returned to Turkey (i.e. LGBTI refugees) will not be adequately assessed, nor their administrative protections as per EU law upheld. Weaknesses in the Greek asylum were already considered severe when the European Court of Human Rights suspended returns to Greece under the Dublin Regulations (which ordinarily stipulate that an asylum claim be assessed in the first participating country where the fingerprints are taken) in 2011, prior to the currrent situation which has been widely reported as inefficient and ineffective. Human Rights Watch has alleged that the EU-Turkey deal has resulted in thousands being trapped in Greece for a year with no effective access to an asylum system at all.

 

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Conditions in Greece, 2017. Photo: National Hearald

 

Links and references:

On the EU-Turkey deal specifically:

 

Happy human rights day! Now, what was that about ‘enjoying’ asylum?

December 10 is International Human Rights Day, commemorating the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Although the UDHR is not legally binding in the sense that a treaty is, many of its principles have been reflected in other international treaties, and there is a growing sense that the unanimous adoption by the General Assembly represents a strong commitment by States, which could be perceived as a principle of customary international law.

There are a lot of interesting elements to the UDHR, but let’s for a moment focus on Article 14(1): “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”

If Article 14 is the officially non-binding human right, the binding version is expressed in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention: “1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (” refouler “) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” The concept of “expel or return” also extends to not turning back people seeking asylum at the borders. So here we have a codified, binding right to seek asylum from persecution in another country.

But what about the part of “enjoying” asylum? The word was probably not intended to reflect “enjoyment” in the sense of amusement parks, beach holidays, or eternal happiness. However the fact that “seek” and “enjoy” are listed separately implies that crossing the border is “seeking” asylum, and “enjoying” asylum is something different.

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Some of “enjoying” asylum might be related to the standards of treatment as a refugee. The 1951 Refugee Convention states a number of rights and privileges to which refugees should have access – rights to things like employment, education, and documentation, some of which we discussed in a previous post – but many of these rights, at least as written in the Convention, indicate that refugees should have rights comparable to those of other foreigners, and only in some limited cases should refugees enjoy rights on equal footing to nationals. There is an interesting article by Alice Edwards, which looks at exactly this topic as applied to the right to employment and the right to family life. Edwards concludes that, “There is no doubt that the 1951 Convention retains its ‘central place in the international refugee protection regime’ [ …] Yet it is similarly clear that the 1951 Convention does not cover the many rights nor deal with the range of issues facing forcibly displaced persons today.” (read the whole article here) Some of the main thrust of Edwards’ article is whether international human rights law or instruments such as the ICCPR or IESCR might fill the gap where the 1951 Convention does not fully ensure a meaningful existence for refugees.

Abstract: “Increasingly hard-line and restrictive asylum policies and practices of many governments call into question the scope of protections offered by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Has the focus on the 1951 Convention been to the detriment and subordination of other rights and standards of treatment owed to refugees and asylum-seekers under international human rights law? Which standard applies in the event that there is a clash or inconsistency between the two bodies of law? In analysing the interface between international refugee law and international human rights law, this article looks at the right to family life and the right to work. Through this examination, content and meaning is offered to the almost forgotten component of the right ‘to enjoy’ asylum in Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.” (Edwards, Alice, Int J Refugee Law (2005)17 (2): 293-330. doi:10.1093/ijrl/eei011

 In addition to standards of treatment, one could also consider whether the concept of “durable solutions” might also fit within this concept of “enjoyment” of asylum. UNHCR’s Mandate charges the High Commissioner with  “providing international protection … and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees.” These permanent solutions are local integration, voluntary repatriation, and resettlement. UNHCR is charged with finding a solution for refugees – but States do not have an obligation in this direction, beyond a general one to aid UNHCR in its general efforts.

So what is really happening?

Well, on balance, the ability to seek asylum is pretty widely established, and generally well respected, although there are some substantial exceptions (Australia and EU, we are looking at you!). There has been an increasing push towards return, particularly to Somalia and also Afghanistan; where return is voluntary, it can be a durable solution, but if involuntary, return would constitute refoulement (cf Art 33).
Enjoyment of asylum is lagging behind. Although UNHCR estimates that some 60% of all refugees  (and 80% of internally displaced persons) live in urban and rural areas outside of camps, still, almost 8 million refugees are languishing in camps. Often, populations in camps have movement restrictions or strict encampment policies requiring them to live in camps, often without the right to work and therefore dependent on humanitarian aid for survival. Humanitarian aid which may then become limited as funding decreases and new situations arise.

“For decades, the default response to refugee crises has been to set up camps or settlements and coerce refugees into them. Camps, it was argued, were best suited to meet the social, economic and political realities in which refugees are living. Yet a significant body of research has demonstrated the exact opposite, pointing to the fact that those refugees who have opted out of the camp system – even when that means forgoing any humanitarian assistance – have established an effective alternative approach to exile. They have managed to live in areas where they feel more secure, and have engaged in the local economy. Far from being passive victims, they have taken control of their lives, often without any external assistance. Until recently, however, there has been strong resistance to modifying policy to reflect this reality and harness the potential of refugees: the settlement model has suited the powerful interests of governments and UNHCR alike.” (full article)

In a recent UNHCR study surveying 90 operations, there were still substantial restrictions and barriers to accessing basic services, movement, employment, or agricultural opportunities, even for those populations living outside of camps.

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We also have to take into consideration the length of time during which refugees are refugees. UNHCR frequently quotes the statistic of an average of 17 years (!) (although the source and veracity of that statistic has come to be questioned) in order to emphasize the point that refugees do not generally enjoy a brief stay before returning home; often, the displacement can last decades or generations. A US State Department report, quoting UNHCR, indicates that “UNHCR estimates that the average length of major protracted refugee situations is now 26 years. Twenty-three of the 32 protracted refugee situations at the end of 2015 have lasted for more than 20 years.”

Former UNHCR staffer, who headed the Za’atri refugee camp in Jordan, pointed out in a recent interview that,

“These are the cities of tomorrow, The average stay today in a camp is 17 years. That’s a generation. In the Middle East, we were building camps: storage facilities for people. But the refugees were building a city. I mean what’s the difference between someone in Philly and somebody in a refugee city? We have to get away from the concept that, because you have that status – migrant, refugee, martian, alien, whatever – you’re not allowed to be like everybody else.”

An interesting ODI study found that,

“Most displacement crises will persist for many years. A rapidly resolved crisis of any significant proportions is a rare exception. Data from 1978–2014 suggests that less than one in 40 refugee crises are resolved within three years, and that ‘protractedness’ is usually a matter of decades. More than 80% of refugee crises last for ten years or more; two in five last 20 years or more. The persistence of crises in countries with internal displacement is also notable. Countries experiencing conflict-related displacement have reported figures for IDPs over periods of 23 years on average. Understanding the likelihood of protractedness from the outset – and well before the five years that is the current UNHCR threshold for protracted refugee situations – should influence the shape and duration of national and international interventions.”

So where to now?

The conclusion is and should be that short-term approaches are not sufficient; that having asylum-seekers and refugees is a long-term commitment; that efforts towards self-reliance, livelihoods, and sustainability are important; and that it is not just enough to be able to seek asylum – refugees must be able to enjoy it, in some meaningful sense of the word. Efforts such as UNHCR’s Policy on Alternatives to Camps are a good start, but must be matched by hosting state commitments such as the fifteen countries who committed during the September 2016 summit to take concrete action to improve refugees’ ability to work lawfully by adopting policies that permit refugees to start their own businesses, expanding or enacting policies that allow refugees to live outside camps, making agricultural land available, and issuing the documents necessary to work lawfully.

Continue reading Happy human rights day! Now, what was that about ‘enjoying’ asylum?

From Dadaab to Despair: what now for this so-called “voluntary” return to Somalia

Did you know that the third-largest city in Kenya is a refugee camp? Did you know that some of the the residents of that camp have been there for three generations?  Did you know that now they are going “home”, a place most of them have only heard of, whether they like it or not?

Welcome to the largest refugee camp in the world: Daadab, a place where  1,000 babies are born every month, but only 2,000 leave each year. Dadaab was built in 1992 for 90,000 refugees fleeing the war in Somalia. Today it is home to an estimated half a million people, 350,000 of them registered refugees“an urban area the size of Bristol, Zurich or New Orleans.” It is now considered the largest refugee camp in the world.

Conditions are difficult at best: “The residents cannot work and cannot leave. Permanent structures are forbidden: there must be no bricks, no concrete, no power lines; no proper roads, no sanitation, no drainage and no toilets.The half a million inmates use pit latrines for toilets, and there is a shortage of 35,000.”

But the camp should not be seen only as a burden on Kenyan society: despite Kenya’s strict encampment policy, a report commissioned by the governments of Norway, Denmark and Kenya in 2010 found that the camps’ businesses generated an annual turnover of $25m (£17.5m). The host community earned $1.8m from the sale of livestock alone to refugees.And the camp itself has its own economy and elections, where “these days, in the market, you can buy everything from an iPhone to an ice-cream.” Nevertheless, the government resists any constructions that “looked too much like real houses”, and it has torn down illegal power lines; refugees are not allowed to work, even if they manage to obtain diplomas.

Despite strong reasons why Kenya may wish to consider local integration, in reality few durable solutions are available, as Kenya does not allow local integration in any meaningful sense, and with extremely limited resettlement opportunities – only 43,000 departures of Somalis from Kenya since 2003 – refugees in Dadaab are essentially trapped if they are unwilling to return to Somalia.

The end of an era?

And now, after 25 years, Dadaab may close.

In 2013, Kenya, Somalia and the refugee agency UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement which would have facilitated refugees voluntarily move to Somalia followed by a pilot programme in 2014-2015 in which around 2,500 people returned to Somalia. As UNHCR describes it,

On 2 April 2015, Al-Shabaab militants launched an attack on the University College of Garissa in Kenya, killing 148 Kenyan students. In the aftermath of the attack, the political leaders of Kenya’s North Eastern Region called for the closure of the Dadaab camps, and a number of senior Government officials called for UNHCR to repatriate all Somali refugees in Dadaab to Somalia. However, after a series of démarches reaffirming the voluntariness of the repatriation process, Kenya, Somalia and UNHCR jointly reaffirmed their commitment to a coordinated and humane return process in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement. To this end, the Tripartite Commission was formally launched on 21 April 2015 to oversee the implementation of the Agreement

In May 2016, the Kenyan government announced plans to speed up the repatriation of Somali refugees and close the Dadaab camp in northeastern Kenya by November. Kenyan authorities, with officials from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), then stepped up a 2013 “voluntary” repatriation program.

Defining the terms: “voluntary repatriation”

Voluntary repatriation is defined as the “return in safety and in dignity to the country of origin” and re-availment of national protection. In order for the return to be voluntary, refugees must be genuinely free choice about whether to return and be fully informed about conditions in their home country

According to Human Rights Watch, returns under the ongoing program amount to refoulement, because they are neither voluntary nor fully informed decisions:

Refugees said the government’s decision to close the Dadaab camp had left them feeling trapped. They are afraid to return to Somalia, but also afraid of being arrested and deported if they stay in Dadaab until the November deadline. Many have therefore chosen to take US$400 in cash as part of a UNHCR-returns assistance package because they believe that if they don’t, they will be summarily deported later this year with nothing.

HRW alleges that the Kenyan authorities are insisting on closing the camp, irrespective of whether any refugees wish to stay, are cutting rations in an effort to encourage or force refugees to opt for the repatriation “package” which includes $400 and 3 months’ food rations, and are not being honest about the situation in Somalia. HRW also pointed out that UNHCR’s information regarding Somalia is not correct, or is at odds with other information published by UNHCR:

UNHCR-Somalia officials acknowledged to Human Rights Watch that their assessments indicate that conditions in south-central Somalia are not conducive to mass refugee returns in safety and dignity. UNHCR’s latest assessment in May found: “Civilians continue to be severely affected by the conflict, with reports of civilians being killed and injured in conflict-related violence, widespread sexual and gender-based violence against women and children, forced recruitment of children, and large-scale displacement.”

The information that UNHCR provides to refugees in Dadaab seeking to make an informed choice about returning, however, is mostly superficial and out of date, and sometimes misleading, Human Rights Watch said.

UNHCR “shares some of the concerns” recently raised by Human Rights Watch but did not specifically endorse the allegations.

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Returns: but where to?

In August 2016, Kenya decided to “hold back its decision to close Daadab camp until peace in Somalia is restored,”  and although refugee verification exercise is complete, the process of repatriation may take longer given the security situation in Somalia.

Also in August, “Authorities in southern Somalia say they have blocked Somali refugees returning from Kenya because the refugees do not get the humanitarian support they need once they reach major cities.” Returnees are given a cash grant and transportation, but they are returning to areas where adequate shelter, food, and water do not exist, not to mention educational and medical facilities already overstretched with IDPs sheltering in those areas.

Following HRW’s allegations in September 2016 that Kenya is harassing and intimidating Somali refugees to return home when it is not safe to do so, Kenya rejected the allegations nevertheless reaffirmed on Thursday its plan to close the camp by November.

As a recent op-ed described it,

“It is impossible to call what is happening “voluntary” by any definition of the word. Yet both Kenya and UNHCR persist in doing so. This is a betrayal of the refugees and a dangerous precedent. Now, other countries in the region want their own tripartite agreement. Kenya has shown how to push UNHCR into a corner and close a refugee camp in the absence of any of the normal criteria for doing so. Europe and the United States, having abrogated any moral high ground on protecting refugees, are easily shamed by Kenya into pledging money toward the returns process, lending weight and momentum to the farce.”

 

 Read the full HRW report: Kenya: Involuntary Refugee Returns to Somalia:  Camp Closure Threat Triggers Thousands Returning to Danger, Human Rights Watch, 14 September 2016.

 

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Nauru: “what’s the point of surviving at sea if you die here?”

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Today, around 2,000 reports were leaked of abuse, psychological disturbance, sexual assault and degrading treatment that the people, particularly children, detained on Nauru have experienced. The scale, variety, and seriousness of the allegations should be shocking.The institutional response is appalling (from the Guardian article):

In one report an asylum seeker described being told she was “on a list” written by local Nauruan guards naming single women they were “waiting for”. “She has received offers to get her pregnant when she gets out,” the caseworker wrote.

They reveal allegations of misconduct by Wilson Security guards at the detention centre. In one report a “cultural adviser” for Wilson Security, the company that employs guards at the detention camp, allegedly told an asylum seeker who had been sexually assaulted in camp that “rape in Australia is very common and people don’t get punished”.

The caseworker who filed the report wrote that the female asylum seeker also told her the guard had questioned whether the sexual assault had occurred and said: “If that happened to you why didn’t you scream at the time?”

“You have to take it out of your head if you go into Nauru then he [the alleged perpetrator] could be your neighbour or if you go to Cambodia then he could be on the plane next to you,” the adviser reportedly told the woman. “You also have to teach your son to treat this man nicely.”

The Nauru Database: Interactive

A few things are worth pointing out:

  1. Not all allegations are always substantiated. The government claims that these reports are only that, and are “evidence of rigorous reporting mechanisms.” From this we can infer that these reports were not followed up or investigated or prosecuted, because then the government would be able to reply with an actual statistic of the steps they have taken to address the issues. Quite a lot of the allegations are involving crimes that, in the case of some of the sexual abuse allegations, would involve criminal sentences of 10 to 25 years if prosecuted in Australia.
  2. The fact that access to the facility is extremely restricted does not bode well for the alleged transparency and humane conditions supposedly found there. Nothing is more suspicious than a secret facility with indefinite detention – it is why organizations like the ICRC spend a lot of time monitoring detention facilities.
  3. There is a conflict of interest when the agency required to investigate is the agency also responsible for the staff who are allegedly the perpetrators of the misconduct.
  4. Australia has a duty of care, and legal responsibility for all of the people in this facility, whether or not they have contracted it out.

This is what Australian taxpayers are funding to the tune of 1.2 billion per year.

 

The Nauru files: 2,000 leaked reports reveal scale of abuse of children in Australian offshore detention (the Guardian)

The devastating trauma and abuse inflicted on children held by Australia in offshore detention has been laid bare in the largest cache of leaked documents released from inside its immigration regime.  More than 2,000 leaked incident reports from Australia’s detention camp for asylum seekers on the remote Pacific island of Nauru – totalling more than 8,000 pages – are published by the Guardian today. The Nauru files set out as never before the assaults, sexual abuse, self-harm attempts, child abuse and living conditions endured by asylum seekers held by the Australian government, painting a picture of routine dysfunction and cruelty.  The Guardian’s analysis of the files reveal that children are vastly over-represented in the reports. More than half of the 2,116 reports – a total of 1,086 incidents, or 51.3% – involve children, although children made up only about 18% of those in detention on Nauru during the time covered by the reports, May 2013 to October 2015.

Focus on Australia: Go to Hell, go directly to Hell. Do not pass go, do not collect asylum in Australia

Photo: Australian Refugee Council’s 2016 calendar.

 

Australia: Appalling Abuse, Neglect of Refugees on Nauru (Human Rights Watch / Amnesty)

About 1,200 men, women, and children who sought refuge in Australia and were forcibly transferred to the remote Pacific island nation of Nauru suffer severe abuse, inhumane treatment, and neglect, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International said today. The Australian government’s failure to address serious abuses appears to be a deliberate policy to deter further asylum seekers from arriving in the country by boat.

Refugees and asylum seekers on Nauru, most of whom have been held there for three years, routinely face neglect by health workers and other service providers who have been hired by the Australian government, as well as frequent unpunished assaults by local Nauruans. They endure unnecessary delays and at times denial of medical care, even for life-threatening conditions. Many have dire mental health problems and suffer overwhelming despair – self-harm and suicide attempts are frequent. All face prolonged uncertainty about their future.

“Australia’s policy of exiling asylum seekers who arrive by boat is cruel in the extreme,” said Anna Neistat, senior director for research at Amnesty International, who conducted the investigation on the island for the organization. “Few other countries go to such lengths to deliberately inflict suffering on people seeking safety and freedom.”

By forcibly transferring refugees and people seeking asylum to Nauru, detaining them for prolonged periods in inhuman conditions, denying them appropriate medical care, and in other ways structuring its operations so that many experience a serious degradation of their mental health, the Australian government has violated the rights to be free from torture and other ill-treatment, and from arbitrary detention, as well as other fundamental protections, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International said.

‘We are dead souls in living bodies’: Australia accused of abusing refugees (CNN)

Daily violence, suicide attempts and children left without medical treatment were among some of the allegations documented by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch during a visit to Australia’s detention center on the remote Pacific Island of Nauru in July.

Australia Allows Abuse of Refugees to Deter Others, Rights Groups Say (NYT)

 “The Australian government is commissioning the abuse of these people,” Anna Neistat, a senior director for research at Amnesty International who spent five days on Nauru in July, said by telephone from Paris on Wednesday. “It pays for the companies that detain the refugees, it pays for the guards, and it fails to provide adequate medical care. Australian taxpayers are funding it. And the world does not know this place exists.”

See also: Australia deliberately ignores refugee abuse: report (Al Jazeera)

Two leading rights groups accuse Australia of ignoring abuse to deter people from trying to travel to the country.

Australia – liable for criminal prosecution

It should be noted that while Australia’s policies might be among the more egregious, few Western countries have clean hands when it comes to treatment of migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees.

The United Nations has found that Australia’s immigration detention regime breaches international law, amounting to arbitrary and indefinite detention, and that men, women and children are held in violent and dangerous conditions.

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It’s not just in Greece that refugees are stranded (IRIN)

Indonesia had long been a transit country for thousands of asylum seekers trying to reach Australian shores. But Australia launched Operation Sovereign Borders in September 2013, policing its waters and turning back boats with such efficiency that it has all but blocked off the route. Several hundred new asylum seekers, however, are still arriving in Indonesia every month. An ever-increasing number are now spending years in limbo in a country that neither recognises them as refugees nor offers any possibility of local integration.  Resettlement to a third country is the only option for most of the nearly 14,000 asylum seekers and refugees now stranded in Indonesia (up from 10,000 two years ago). Australia used to be the country that accepted the majority of refugees in Indonesia for resettlement, but now it only takes those who registered there before July 2014.  Other countries with resettlement programmes, many of them preoccupied with the refugee exodus from Syria, have done little to help.  With no right to work and little support available from the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR, many new arrivals simply hand themselves over to the Indonesian authorities knowing that at least they’ll be fed and sheltered while they’re detained.

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Australia ordered to resettle nearly 900 asylum seekers held on Manus Island detention centre after PNG ruled the centre illegal (Trust.org)

The asylum seekers come from across the Middle East and Asia predominately, with Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan accounting for the bulk. Some have been held in detention for several years. Lawyers for the 898 Manus island detainees have asked the Supreme Court for compensation of 1,500 kina ($462.75) for every day they were held illegally. The Supreme Court said it would call on Australia to provide a representative on Thursday to provide details on a resettlement plan.

See also: The cost of Australia’s asylum policy

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 Australia (US State Department)

The main human rights problems were domestic violence against women and children, particularly in indigenous communities; indigenous disadvantage; and policies affecting asylum seekers, including detention and detention center conditions for some attempting to reach the country by sea.

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Continue reading Focus on Australia: Go to Hell, go directly to Hell. Do not pass go, do not collect asylum in Australia

Now you have refugees, what are you meant to do with them? A look at the travaux préparatoires on the “lawful stay”, rights to primary education and employment

Following our Happy Birthday wish to the 1951 Convention, we gave a very short introduction to some of the interesting bits of that Convention.  Here, we discuss some of the elements in the Convention, with a look back at the Travaux Préparatoires. The travaux préparatoires provide a look at what each of the States parties negotiating the treaty thought about the wording of each of the Articles, and a discussion on the meaning or intention of many of the provisions.

Convention standards for juridical status, employment, welfare,  and administrative measures such as freedom of movement

On the subject of welfare, the Convention has several articles, dealing, respectively, with rationing, housing, public education, public relief, and labour legislation and social security (articles 20 through 24). So does that mean that as soon as someone shows up, they are entitled to every benefit of one’s generous welfare society?

Not precisely. Interestingly, the Articles make a few distinctions: some articles require that you treat refugees the same way as you treat nationals, and others require that you treat refugees as well as possible and/or not worse than other aliens in the same circumstance. Some of the articles make a distinction between refugees and refugees lawfully staying in their territory. Let’s take some examples:

  Refugees Refugees lawfully staying
Accord “the same treatment as nationals”
  • Rationing, “Where rationing exists, which applies to the population at large and regulates the general distribution of products in short supply” (Art. 20);
  • Public elementary education (Art. 22(1));

 

  • Public relief and assistance (Art. 23);
  • Labour legislation and social security: laws and regulations pertaining to working conditions; social security; compensation/redress for occupational accidents or death (Art. 24(1)).

 

Accord “the most favorable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country, in the same circumstances”
  • Right of association (Art. 15);
  • Wage-earning employment (Art. 17(1)).
Treatment “as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances:
  • Movable and immovable property (Art. 13);
  • Education other than elementary, “in particular as regards access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships”. (Art. 22(2)).
  • Self-employment , “the right to engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies” (Article 18);
  • Liberal professions, “who hold diplomas recognized by the competent authorities of that State, and who are desirous of practicing a liberal profession,” (Art. 19(1));
  • Housing, “So far as the matter is regulated by laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public authorities” (Art. 21).

What do we mean by lawfully staying?

The distinction between refugees (generally) and refugees lawfully staying in the territory is one made throughout the 1951 Convention. According to the travaux préparatoires:

[T]he mention of ‘refugees’ without any qualifying phrase was intended to include all refugees, whether lawfully or unlawfully in the territory. (Art. 20)

The expression ‘lawfully within their territory’ throughout this Draft Convention would exclude a refugee who while lawfully admitted has overstayed the period for which he was admitted or was authorized to stay, or who has violated any other conditions attached to his admission or stay.’ (TP, Art. 15)

The discussion around “lawfully staying” draws a distinction between “lawfully staying”, “unlawfully staying”, and “lawfully in (but not resident of)”. It is related to the manner of entry, and the final phrase resulted at least partially from difficulties in translating French terms such as résidance habituelle and se trouvant régulièrement into English, because of differences in the meaning between résidance and the somewhat more permanent residence (domicile and sojourn were suggested as possible alternatives). The same can be inferred from Article 31 (“Refugees Unlawfully in the Country of Refuge”), which prohibits States from imposing penalties on those who enter or are in the territory “without authorization”. Interestingly, Article 31(2) discussions what restrictions of movement may be applicable “until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country.” But there is no requirement for permanent asylum or a specific legal status of refugees.

The Travaux conclude with the following definition:

It results from the travaux préparatoirs that any refugee who, with the authorization of the authorities, is in the territory of a Contracting State otherwise than purely temporarily, is to be considered as ‘lawfully staying’ (‘résidant régulièrement’).

Hathaway makes the point that that “a refugee is lawfully staying (résident régulièrement) when his or her presence in a given state is ongoing in practical terms. This may be because he or she has been granted asylim consequent to formal recognition of refugee status. But refugees admitted to a so-called “temporary protection” system or other durable protection regime are also lawfully staying. So long as the refugee enjoys officially sanctioned, ongoing presence in a state party, he or she is lawfully staying in the host country; there is no requirement of a formal declaration of refugee status, grant of the right of permanent residence, or establishment of domicile.” The footnote to this paragraph notes, “This understanding is consistent with the basic structure of the Refugee Convention, which does not require states formally to adjudicate status or assign any particular immigration status to refugees, which does not establish a right to permanent ‘asylum,’ and which is content to encourage, rather than to require, access to naturalization.” (p. 730)

What’s the point? Rights in practice

Education

If we return to the table above, we see that some of the rights, such as rationing and public elementary education, are meant to be extended to any refugee (= anyone with a well-founded fear of persecution etc etc) on the same basis as nationals. There should be no distinction between refugees and nationals, and (according to Article 3) with no discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or country of origin. In practice, however, there are quite a lot of challenges in ensuring refugees’ access to primary education: some of the countries that have not signed the 1951 Convention may treat refugees as illegal migrants and restrict their access to schooling; educational opportunities may be limited and often vary accross camp and urban settings within a country; and refugees face frequent disruptions to their schooling. But issues about education for refugees is a whole other post.

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Right to wage-earning employment

Dr Paul Weis, in his commentary to the Travaux, characterized this Article as “one of the most important.” Refugees  lawfully staying are to be accorded “the most favorable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country, in the same circumstances”.

The second paragraph does not mean that refugees must be granted national treatment. In many countries aliens require a work permit and in this case, it is required of refugees, too, unless they have been specifically exempted from it, but it
has to be accorded to them ex officio if they fulfil any of the conditions stipulated in paragraph 2. It does not exclude conditions attached to the admission of refugees or their stay. Measures for the protection of the national labour market are either measures imposed on aliens such as restrictions in time or space or concerning employment in certain occupations, or restrictions on the employment of aliens such as fixing a certain number or percentage of aliens in general or in certain occupations or enterprises, or the provision that aliens may only be employed if no nationals are available for the job in question. As the Article provides that refugees shall be ‘exempt from restrictions’ it would seem not to exclude the imposition of restrictions in the future. Only restrictions for the protection of the national labour market are excluded, not measures taken in the interest of national security such as the prohibition of employment of aliens in defence industries. The prohibition of the employment of aliens in the civil service or in certain categories of the civil service which exists in many countries, is also not excluded.

Right to self-employmet

On the other hand, we have the rights to housing, liberal professions and self-employment, which are limited to refugees lawfully staying in a territory and the treatment should be “as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.” So if a restriction on exercising a profession would apply to a foreigner generally, that restriction would also apply to refugees. And this can be a big hurdle, because quite a lot of states have restrictions on foreigners working, exercising a profession, and owning businesses.

A look at the Travaux indicates that there was quite a bit of divergence in terms of States’ approach

The amendment was motivated in part by the fact that foreigners arriving in the UK were required not to engage in selfemployment without permission for a certain time, after which they were free to engage in any profession they choose.

The Turkish representative said under Turkish law, only nationals could be self-employed, and Turkey would consequently have to reserve its position on that Article, no matter what its wording. He thought the most acceptable solution would be to accord to refugees the treatment given to foreigners generally.

The Belgian representative was also in favour of according to refugees the treatment given to foreigners generally.

The US representative felt that solution would confer no real benefits on refugees, and wondered whether it might not be possible to find a third solution, whereby refugees would be granted not the most favourable treatment, but a treatment more favourable than that given to foreigners generally.

So what happens in reality?

Despite the very explicit protections for the right to work in the Convention, and complemented by other international instruments such as Article 6 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (which provides the “right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts” unfortunately, the IESCR only requires States to “take steps” towards that right), there is still a long way to go on refugee employment: a number of states have outright bans on employment, and access to employment in countries where it is legal often have significant de-facto barriers, like strict encampment policies, fees for permits, or administrative barriers such as document or bank account requirements that may be in practice impossible to fulfill.

Let’s look at the right to self-employment. This should be understood to also encompass the opening of businesses. The article refers to the right to self-employment, “as regards the right to engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies.” Self-employment “on his own account” was seen as a low-cost activity that states should simply “allow” to happen – but some scholars argue that this Article actually requires states to facilitate access to self-employment, i.e. access to arable land or remove administrative barriers.

But it’s not all bad news!

In South Africa, a precedent decision relied not only on Articles 17(1) and 18 of the Refugee Convention, but also an article of the South African Constitution that guarantees the right to human dignity, to hold that refugees and asylim-seekers have a right to open businesses to avoid starvation or destitution:

In Somali Association of South Africa, et al., v. Limpopo Department of Economic Development, Environment, and Tourism, Judge Navsa overturned the lower court’s ruling and held that, because refugees might be left destitute without the opportunity to open businesses, refugees have the right to open businesses in South Africa.

In doing so, the Court drew support from Articles 17(1) and (18) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which clearly favor giving refugees the right to work and self-employment, but falls short of demanding that a State must allow refugees to work. The Court therefore grounded its holding in municipal law. Section 27(f) of South Africa’s Refugees Act of 1988 indicates that refugees are entitled to seek employment. Additionally, Section 10 of South Africa’s Constitution guarantees the right to human dignity.

The Court’s precedent in Watchenuka held that the constitutional right to human dignity required that refugees be given the right to seek employment. In Somali Association, the Court extended this logic to require that refugees be allowed to open new businesses: “[I]f… a refugee or asylum seeker is unable to obtain wage-earning employment and is on the brink of starvation, which brings with it humiliation and degradation, and that person can only sustain him or herself by engaging in trade, such a person ought to be able to rely on the constitutional right to dignity in order to advance a case for the granting of a license to trade…” As a result of these two decisions, refugees and asylum-seekers in South Africa now have the right to apply for and renew business permits and licenses. It is unlawful for the government to close permitted businesses or confiscate property.

But the judge did not stop with legal observations, further noting that “one is left with the uneasy feeling that the stance adopted by the authorities in relation to the licensing of … shops was in order to induce foreign nationals who were destitute to leave our shores.” The Court’s decision should go some length to ensure that “destitute” refugees can live in dignity in South Africa. (Full article here)

Happy birthday, Geneva Convention!

I tried to photoshop a birthday hat onto the convention but it didn’t work

65 years ago, at a meeting in Geneva on 28 July 1951, a convention was signed that has formed the basis for one of the most enduring international legal regimes, and was eventually signed by 166 countries. This Convention does many things: it defines who is a refugee, who is not, and what obligations States have towards those who are recognized as refugees, particularly in respect to areas such as documentation, access to education and work, and standards of treatment. One of the most important obligation is that States may not return anyone to their country of origin if they could face persecution there. This idea, that States can’t send people to their torture, degradation, or death, has since been included in other conventions, and now is considered part of customary international law. Another, but less well-respected, obligation is that States can’t penalize people for illegal entry if they are fleeing persecution.

Arguably, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 1967 Protocol), are arguably one of the most effective human rights instruments around. Yet there are some, such as the Danish Prime Minister (Denmark: also known for its absurd policy of confiscating valuables from refugees ostensibly to pay for their stay – because let’s face it, the whole idea is to have refugees live with the most indignity possibly, just to prove we have the power) who wish to roll back the 1951 Convention. Because if you can’t live up to the standard, the best approach is to just lower the bar, right?

What the 1951 Convention does and does not do

It defines who is a refugee

Interestingly, the scenario that most people imagine when they think of refugees – in a country at war, a city is bombed, and faced with or fearing destruction of their home and death of family members, they flee – is not really within the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee (Article 1a, for anyone who cares to look). The 51 Convention definition is focused on a “well-founded fear of persecution” due to “race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.” There is a bit more nuance involved, such as determining if the bombings or attacks were directed at a specific ethnic, religious, or other group (i.e., all members of XYZ group support the armed resistance group ABC, hence areas with high population of XYZ group were targeted for bombing). But for this reason, additional legal regimes, with broader definitions of refugees, have sprung up in Latin America, Africa, and, in the EU, under the concept of Subsidiary Protection.And it does raise the question if the definition that we have and use is really the best reflection of the world in which we live.

But the convention is helpful: first, it provides a common definition to which 148 countries have ascribed, and quite a number of these have included the 1951 refugee definition, or something very similar to it, in their national legislation. This common ground hasn’t removed all discrepancies and differences in interpretation among countries, but has certainly provided a common language and an international standard to which each country can be compared. Second, it provides a kind of scaffolding on which additional legal instruments can build. Elements of non-refoulement (non-return to a place of death, torture, or persecution) have been included in other treaties such as the Convention Against Torture and the European Convention on Human Rights, and also help provide protection to those who may not be refugees but may still be in danger. The efforts to improve the situation of stateless people has also built on the successes of the 1951 Convention. Finally, regional agreements allow States to include issues that are relevant to them – not only in terms of refugees, but also taking up issues such as internally displaced persons.

The main issues with the current 1951 refugee definition are as follows: although some of the additional legal instruments allow for a bit of a wider definition of who is a refugee to include people displaced by foreign occupation, invasion, generalized violence, or events seriously disturbing public order, the definition was crafted in the post-WWII context and had specific populations in mind. Although, through legal interpretation and UNHCR’s own efforts, the definition of refugee now comfortably accommodates the situation of LGBTI individuals, other situations which might cause people to flee, such as domestic violence (particularly in male-dominated societies with few/no legal resources or State response), Female Genital Mutilation, violence connected with criminal organizations, discrimination that may not be violent but may impede a normal life, persecution by non-State actors (blood feuds and tribal disputes, for example), and similar kinds of situations.

It defines who is not a refugee

The framers of the convention decided that this concept of protection should only extend to those who deserve it, and should not apply to those who are themselves persecutors or who are fleeing prosecution (not persecution!). So the idea that refugee status protects war criminals and terrorists isn’t true – or rather, if there are war criminals and terrorists who have refugee status, it is because they successfully lied or the country/entity evaluating their case did not do a thorough job investigating them. Interestingly, several individuals who were allegedly perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity in Rwanda had gotten refugee status in some countries. Because of the complexity of actually convicting them of genocide or war crimes or crimes against humanity, many of them had their refugee status revoked due to immigration violations for omitting or falsifying information when applying for asylum.

Imagine, then, that our fictional client has an Interpol Red Notice . According to Interpol, “the persons concerned are wanted by national jurisdictions for prosecution or to serve a sentence based on an arrest warrant or court decision.” Clearly criminal and undeserving of refugee status, right? Well, some countries use criminal prosecution as a way to persecute people, particularly dissidents or opponents, or those who fund opposition parties. Countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine have used this tactic. But it’s not limited to Central Asia and Eastern Europe; other offenders include Indonesia, Venezuela, Turkey and Bolivia:

Mr. Ochoa Urioste is a politically active attorney from Bolivia who became the subject of a Red Notice when certain officials within the Bolivian government targeted him for the prosecution of ordinary law crimes, after he refused to participate in the execution of contractual agreements that he found to be illegal — and he publicly criticized President Evo Morales.

Interpol has recently changed its policy to withdraw a “wanted person” alert if the person is confirmed to have refugee status, in recognition of the fact that states may use judicial avenues to persecute people.

[See Part 2: Now you have refugees, what are you meant to do with them?]